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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 27

APRIL 1975

NUMBER 1

THE SOUTH CAROLINA HUMAN AFFAIRS
LAW: TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP
BACK?
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN*
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER**

This is the second and final installment of a five part article
analyzing the South Carolina Human Affairs Law. In the initial
installment' Part I described in general terms the new law and
its area of operation; Part HI considered the relationship between
the Human Affairs Law and title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act;
and Part III analyzed the various methods of enforcement of
rights created under state law. This installment concludes the
study with the final two parts of the article. Part IV examines the
more significant substantive provisions of the statute. The methodology mainly consists of an analysis of title VII, the basic tool
for interpreting the South Carolina statute, and a discussion of
those aspects where title VII and the Human Affairs Law differ.
Part V is devoted to treatment of the problems associated with
the attempt of the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission to
encourage state agencies to adopt affirmative action plans. Finally, some conclusions are drawn from the entire study which,
we hope, will prove useful to attorneys and courts in dealing with
the law as well as to the Human Affairs Commission in implementing it.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, School of Law. B.A., Siena
College, 1965; LL.B. Harvard, 1968; LL.M., New York University, 1973.
** Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University, School of Law. A.B., 1964;
J.D., Marquette University, 1967.
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the unstinting (by his own admission) research assistance of Mr. Richard Stein, a 1975 graduate of the University of South
Carolina Law Center.
1. Sullivan and Zimmer, The South CarolinaHuman Affairs Law: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?, 26 S.C.L. REv. 1 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Sullivan &
Zimmer].
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SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

The Nature of Discrimination

1. Four Definitions of Discrimination
The core provision of the South Carolina Human Affairs Law
makes it an unfair employment practice for certain governmental
employers:
To fail or refuse to hire, bar, discharge from employment or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual's race, creed, color, sex, age or national orgin . ...

The key to understanding the scope of this statute, as with all fair
employment practices laws, lies in the word "discrimination." A
broad definition will subject basic employment practices to legal
challenge, while more limited interpretations may severely circumscribe the potential impact of the statute. It is, therefore,
most important at the outset to understand four concepts encompassed by the term and to decide which of these notions the
Commission and the South Carolina courts should adopt in
applying the statute.'
The traditional notion regards discrimination as an intentional act aimed at an individual because of membership in a
disfavored group: an employer refuses to hire a job applicant
saying, "Blacks (or women, Catholics,. etc.) need not apply."4
Although useful in certain egregious situations, restricting the
scope of discrimination to such "evil-motive" actions has limited
2. S.C: CODE ANN. § 1-360.28(a)(1)(Cum. Supp. 1974). Such practices may be remedied by order of the Human Affairs Commission. See Sullivan & Zimmer at 17-18 and
38-61. The law also provides a separate procedure, essentially relying on conciliation, for
discriminatory practices committed by private employers and certain public employers.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.29(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974). The first court litigation under the law
was a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Commission over municipal governments. In City
of Columbia v. Ziegler (not reported), Master in Equity for Richland County Owens T.
Cobb ruled that "agency or department of the State or of its local subdivisions," those
which are subject to coercive Commission order by section 1-360.28, does include political
subdivisions such as the City of Columbia.
3. See generally Blumrosen, Strangersin Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MicH. L. Rav. 59 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Blumrosen].
4. See Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Legislation I:
Employers, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 907, 955-56 (1967); Note, An American Dilemma Proof of
Discrimination,17 U. CHI. L. Rav. 107, 109 (1949).
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impact in the contemporary setting where flagrant assertions of
racism and, to a somewhat lesser extent, sexism, are not as socially acceptable as they once were. Sophisticated discriminators
who merely remain silent about their reasons for a particular
decision will usually force the fair employment practice agency
to engage in laborious and prolonged fact-finding that, at best,
ultimately establishes discrimination on the basis of circumstantial evidence "revealing" the employer's state of mind. Indeed,
the pure "evil-motive" approach achieved so little and was so
cumbersome that courts developed fictionalized categories to establish the requisite state of mind for acts resulting in discrimina5
tion.
Because of these difficulties with the state-of-mind test and,
more importantly, the limited results it achieved in opening job
opportunities to minorities,a second conception of discrimination
evolved-the "equal treatment" or "color blind" model.' Basically, this test finds discrimination where an employer fails to
treat members of a protected group the same as white males.7
This standard is rooted in a free market economic theory which
views unequal treatment as an arbitrary, irrational interference
with the free market; once the racist or sexist differentials are
5. Blumrosen at 68. An analogous situation developed under the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970), in response to employer silence regarding
motivation and anti-union discrimination. The courts were forced, in such circumstances,
to adopt a complicated categorization of fictitious states of mind characterized by shifting
burdens of proof. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967), represented the
culmination of a series of such cases involving employers' efforts to continue operating
during employee strikes (see American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965);
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17 (1954); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)). The Supreme
Court examined the effect of employers' conduct on employees' rights, the employers'
justification for such conduct, and the placement of the burden of proof and found antiunion discrimination despite the absence of employer statements establishing a discriminatory state of mind:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of an
antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice
even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by
business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of discriminatory conduct
on employee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be
proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of
legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct.
388 U.S. at 34 (emphasis in original).
6. See Note, The New York State CommissionAgainst Discrimination:A New Technique for an Old Problem, 56 YALE L.J. 837, 849 (1947).
7. See M. SovERN, LEGAL REsTRAINTs ON RAcIAL DISCRIAMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 7073 (1966).
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removed, the labor market will presumably balance supply with
demand to establish a meritocracy.8 While somewhat more effective than the "evil-motive" notion, if only because proof of unequal treatment is conclusive, not mere evidence of the requisite
bad intent, there are two objections to defining discrimination on
this basis. First, the theory fails to recognize that the leading
economic decision-makers are not in a real sense participants in
a free market but rather are part of a planned economy made up
of large bureaucracies, both private and public, which are resistant to risk or change Secondly, the equal treatment model, by
its own terms, is ineffective in opening employment opportunities
where the job prerequisites are objective criteria or standards
which pose greater obstacles to members of protected groups than
to white males. Application of the concept of discrimination encompassed by the equal treatment model would still permit such
prerequisites, even if unrelated to job performance, so long as
they are applied equally. Even a combination of the "evilmotive" test with the equal treatment notion would permit such
prerequisites so long as they were not the result of a discriminatory motivation. For example, after title VII was passed, industrial psychologists experienced a booming business providing
employers with various pencil-and-paper tests to be used in making employment decisions. Blacks do not currently perform as
well as whites on these tests. While the reason for this is a matter
of dispute, some believing that the purpose of using the tests is
often merely to maintain the traditional white male credential
system'0 and others contending that the tests simply reveal genetic racial deficiencies," the effect is the same. Regardless of
purity of purpose, such "objective" job criteria exclude from jobs
many people, including members of protected classes, without
any proof that the standards have a demonstrated real and sub2
stantial relationship to performance on the job.'
Thus, the combination of "evil-motive" and unequal treat8. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971);
Developments in the Law - Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166 (1971).
9. See J.K. GALBRArrH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973).
10. Koenig, They Just Changed the Rules on How to Get Ahead, 8 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
87 (1974).
11. Jensen, How Much Can We Boast IQ and Scholastic Achievements? 39 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 37 (1969).
12. Another example is height and weight restrictions, used especially by law enforcement agencies, which disqualify a disproportionate number of women and Hispano males.
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ment tests does not meet the real challenge underlying fair employment practices laws, ending the cycle of poverty and discrimination: discrimination in job opportunities results in poverty,
which gives rise to an inferior education that fails to train people
to perform well on objective job standards, which, in turn, results
in reduced employment opportunities. In Johnson v. Pike Corp.
of America13 the court described the problem and made clear how
broadly discrimination must be defined if title VII is to accomplish its intended purposes. Having invalidated a company rule
providing for discharges after excessive garnishments because of
its disproportionate adverse effect on blacks, the court said:
This result may seem harsh to the employer, but it is required
by title VII. In passing the 1964 Act, Congress was fully aware
that putting an end to racially discriminatory employment
practices would place a burden on employers in terms of their
time, inconvenience and expense. One way to end racial discrimination throughout the society was to end it in employment,
thereby opening better paying jobs to minority group members.
The cycle of poverty and discrimination had to be broken someplace; employment, Congress decided, should be one of those
places. The discrimination practiced against members of minority groups by an employer's policy of firing garnishees is not
really intended by the employer. It is the result of broader patterns of exclusion and discrimination practiced by third parties
and fostered by the whole environment in which most minorities
must live. It may seem unfair that the employer should be made
to suffer for the discrimination practiced by others. But this was
the price Congress determined necessary to end discrimination.
If the employer were permitted to discriminate because other
employees, his customers or third persons, were prejudiced
against minorities, the effort to break the desperate ring of discrimination would soon fail. Similarly, if the employer were
permitted to discharge an employee because it cost a little more
to attend to the clerical work when his wages are garnisheed, the
effort to end discrimination would fail. Racial discrimination in
employment cannot be tolerated, the expense or inconvenience
in complying with the law notwithstanding.4
This reflects a third, and very broad, view of discrimination
which has emerged-the "disproportionate impact" or "differential effect" approach. That concept examines employment prac13. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
14. Id. at 496.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

REVIEW

[Vol. 27

tices in terms of adverse consequences on minorities and women,
without regard to purpose.' 5 Unless adverse consequences can be
justified by a showing of business necessity, for example, that the
test predicts actual job performance, the requirement constitutes
illegal discrimination.
This approach takes a structural or systemic perspective
amenable to statistical analysis of the employment system. Initially, a determination of the distribution of members of protected classes throughout the employer's business is made, followed by a comparison of those statistics with minority distribution in the labor markets'" available to the employer. If the employer's distribution is less than the distribution in his labor markets, the inquiry shifts to an examination of the sources of job
applicants, educational prerequisites, tests, and other job qualifications to determine if such requirements disproportionately exclude members of protected classes. If a differential impact exists, it is prima facie illegal unless adequately justified by the
employer.
The collective operation of these tests for discrimination on
an employer's freedom is synergistic in effect. Consider, for example, a requirement that male hairstyles be cut above collar level.
Plainly, this constitutes "evil-motive" discrimination, or at least
unequal treatment, if there are women employees allowed to wear
longer hair. Yet the employer may not be able to avoid this obsta15. Blumrosen at 71-75.
16. It is not clear whether the plaintiff's prima facie case is made out under the
disproportionate impact theory by comparing the employer's work force with the general
populace or whether the comparison must be drawn with some more restricted labor
market (assuming in either case that the relevant geographic area is chosen). Few would
deny that general populace figures become less relevant as the jobs at issue become more
specialized and require advanced skill or training. But the question remains who must
demonstrate which labor markets should be considered. The allocation of the burden of
proof may be critical. For example, suppose an insurance firm has only 25% women in
the job of "claims adjuster." Compared with the general populace, which is 51% female,
this ratio appears discriminatory. It may be, however, that women constitute a proportionately smaller percentage of a particular work force than men (although this may be, at
least in part, due to diminished job opportunities caused by discrimination). Further
suppose, in the geographic area at issue, only one in four inhabitants holds a college
degree, and the company requires such a degree for the claims-adjuster job. It would
appear that, on one comparison, there is prima facie discrimination and, on the other,
there is not. Accordingly, in establishing the prima facie case, cases may turn on whether
general populace figures will suffice (leaving the employer to demonstrate in rebuttal that
a more restricted labor market is the apporpriate comparison) or whether the plaintiff
must show disporportionate lack of representation vis-a-vis a relevant market. Although
the issue has not been definitively resolved, it seems that general populace statistics will
be accepted. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
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cle by requiring all employees, male and female, to have hair no
longer than collar length. Although avoiding the unequal treatment definition of discrimination, the rule now falls afoul of the
differential impact definition if women are, as a class, more adversely affected than men. Although there is good reason to believe the logical impact of this reasoning on the hair cases will be
limited by a judicially-created exception to title VII, 17 the example illustrates that the interaction of the differing notions of discrimination can drastically limit an employer's freedom to govern
and compensate his employees. 8
A fourth view of discrimination imposes on employers a duty
of "equal distribution." Under such a standard an employer must
have each level of his employment structure reflect the representation of protected groups in the labor market. Thus, in an area
where the black population is 10%, employers ought to fill about
10% of the jobs at every job level with blacks. Section 703(j) of
title VII, however, explicitly disclaims such a duty:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require
any employer . . . subject to this title to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer. . . in
comparison with the total number or percentage of such race,
17. For example, the District of Columbia Circuit in Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488
F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), has balked at finding sex discrimination in the hair cases, even though admitting that the rules represent a difference based on sex. To the same effect is Baker v.
California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974). And, in Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publishers, although a panel of the Fifth Circuit initially found refusal to hire a male
based on the length of his hair to be sex discrimination, 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973), on
rehearing en banc, the court reached the opposite result, 507 F.2d 1084 (1975). See
generallyDilloff, Federal CourtLitigationOver the Regulation ofAdult Grooming,38 ALB.
L. REV. 387 (1974); Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 965 (1973).
18. A problem area that cannot be treated quite so cavalierly as the hair cases involves retirement ages and benefits for males and females. Differential retirement ages
would seem clearly illegal under the equal treatment test; it can, however, be argued that
identical ages have a disproportionate impact on females who, as a class, live longer than
males. A related problem concerns pensions and insurance benefits. Because of two-sex
actuarial tables, equal employer cost will buy different insurance and pensions for men
and women; on the other hand, equal benefits can be obtained by the employer at differential cost. See generallyBernstein and Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classification in PensionPrograms,74 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1974); Note, Sex Discriminationand
Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REV. 624 (1973).
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color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section, or other area. 9
The duty to equally distribute representatives from protected
classes is, thus, excluded from the definition of discrimination
covered by title VII. Section 703(j) has been construed, however,
as not restricting the use of numerical ratios and goals as part of
a scheme to remedy past discrimination."
2. "Discrimination" Within the Scope of Title VII and the
Human Affairs Law
The South Carolina Human Affairs Law essentially follows
the substantive structure of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.21 Under general rules of statutory construction, a jurisdiction adopting legislation from another jurisdiction imports with
it the judicial gloss interpreting that legislation.2 2 Thus, title VII
cases decided prior to the enactment of the Human Affairs Law
which interpret identically-worded provisions of the federal statute may be viewed as definitive. Further, those cases construing
title VII which have been decided since the state statute's passage, although not actually controlling as a result of the General
Assembly's incorporation of title VII provisions, are certainly persuasive in construing the Human Affairs Law. Even where the
South Carolina law differs from the federal statute, federal judicial interpretation may be relevant in ascertaining the intent of
the state legislature to reach a different result than that under
title VII.
Section 703(a), the core provision of title VII, makes it an
unlawful employment practice:
To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.?
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).

20. E.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq.

22. See, e.g., Melby v. Anderson, 64 S.D. 249, 266 N.W. 135 (1936); Santee Mills v.
Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922); See also, 2A J. SUTHERLAND, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 52.02 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-2) (1970). Sections (b) and (c) establish the same standard
for employment agencies and unions.
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The language of the Human Affairs Law is substantially identical
to that of title VII. It is an unfair employment practice in South
Carolina for certain governmental employers:
To fail or refuse to hire, bar, discharge from employment or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual's race, creed, color, sex, age or national origin .... 24
It is of utmost importance that, at the time of passage of the
Human Affairs Law, title VII had been authoritatively interpreted to include the first three definitions of discrimination suggested above - "evil-motive," "equal treatment" and "adverse
impact." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 5 the watershed case establishing this multiple definition of discrimination for title VII,
demonstrates, at its different stages, the application of each of
the three views.
Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Duke
Power maintained a system of racial segregation by dividing the
jobs into five departments. All black employees were relegated to
the lowest paying jobs of the labor department and could not
transfer into the four, all-white departments-coal handling, operations, maintenance, and laboratory and test. Whites were
never assigned to the labor department. After 1955 all employees
entering the white departments were required to have high school
diplomas. When title VII became effective in 1965, the company
additionally required all employees entering the formerly allwhite departments to pass two standard industrial tests, the E.F.
Wonderlic Personnel Test, which purported to measure general
intelligence, and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test.
In order to qualify for a transfer into a different department,
employees were additionally required after 1965 to have high
school diplomas. Following protest by white employees without
diplomas employed before the diploma requirement had been
26
imposed, the requirement was dropped for transfers.
The Griggs case began as a class action 7 brought by black
employees at Duke's Dan River station who were still in the labor
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.28(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
25. 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968), rev'd, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
26. 292 F. Supp. at 246.
27. Id. at 244.
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department by virtue of racial assignment.2 8 The district court
found for the company after applying the "evil-motive" test since
the company had, by the time of the decision, transferred the
three blacks who had met the transfer requirement.2 9 Unlike the
district court, the Fourth Circuit applied the second, "equal
treatment," concept of discrimination and found the company in
violation of title VII. While some white employees, who had been
hired before the diploma requirement was imposed in 1955, were
allowed during subsequent years to transfer and be promoted to
better jobs, black employees, also hired before 1955, were confined to the labor department. Since both the white and black
employees had been similarly situated in lacking high school diplomas, equal treatment required that the blacks hired before
1955 be transferred and promoted without regard to the diploma
or testing requirements." Blacks hired after 1955 without high
school diplomas had not been denied equal treatment, however,
since all whites hired after 1955 had diplomas, and were not,
therefore, similarly situated to the blacks. Foreshadowing the
Supreme Court's opinion, Judge Sobeloff dissented in part, quoting Judge Butzer in Quarles v. PhillipMorris, Inc.," that "'Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the

act.'

"32

Neither the Fourth Circuit nor the district court found anything discriminatory about the diploma and testing requirements. The district court found them to be rational management
techniques for securing the best-qualified employees.3 Applying
the "evil-motive" view of discrimination, the Fourth Circuit
found no violation, since the educational requirement was
adopted for a legitimate business purpose of raising general qualifications "with no intention to discriminate against Negro employees who might be hired after the adoption of the educational
requirement." 34 Since the tests had been professionally developed
and no evidence was adduced indicating discrimination in ad28. Three of fourteen blacks had high school diplomas. One was transferred to coal
handling after EEOC charges had been filed. 401 U.S. at 427 n.2. The other two were
promoted while the suit was pending. 420 F.2d 1225, 1229.
29. 292 F. Supp. 243, 247-51.
30. 420 F.2d at 1230-31.
31. 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
32. 420 F.2d at 1247.
33. 292 F. Supp. at 248, 250.
34. 420 F.2d at 1232.
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ministration or scoring, no violation of the "equal treatment"
standard was found.3 5 Thus, the testing requirement was held

valid despite the absence of a showing that scoring well on the
test related to good performance on the job. 6
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion37 authored by
Chief Justice Burger, adopted the "differential impact" or "adverse effect" view of discrimination; once it is established that an
employment practice statistically disqualifies proportionately
more members of a protected group than of the majority group,
the employer has the burden of establishing that the practice is
necessary for the business:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures,
or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If the employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.' s
The Court made clear that title VII encompassed more than
mere prohibition of "evil-motive" discrimination:
The Court of Appeals held that the Company had adopted the
diploma and test requirements without any "intention to discriminate against Negro employees." 420 F.2d at 1232. We do
not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the employer's intent; but good intent
or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "builtin headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.
• . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More than
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1235.
Justice Brennan took no part in the case.
401 U.S. at 429-30.
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that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.39
Judicial notice of the 1960 census figures and several decisions of the EEOC served as the basis for the Court's decision that
the testing and diploma requirements had a differential impact
on blacks. The high school diploma requirement was found to
have a more substantial restrictive effect on blacks than on
whites as demonstrated by the 1960 North Carolina census which
indicated that 34 percent of white males had completed high
school while only 12 percent of black males had done so.10 There
was no evidence that the Dan River plant drew its employees
from the entire geographic area of North Carolina or that applicants for Duke Power jobs reflected a cross-section of the North
Carolina population. Further, in two cases not involving Duke
Power,4' the EEOC had found, relying on the general literature
concerning testing without resort to expert witnesses, that the
Wonderlic and Bennett tests had a differential impact on blacks
because 58 percent of whites passed the test as compared with
only 6 percent of the blacks. The Supreme Court in Griggs took
42
judicial notice of and accepted these findings as a matter of law.
These generalized statistics, then, were sufficient to shift the
burden to the employer to justify the use of the test and diploma
requirements. If sufficient justification could be established, the
requirements would stand, even though they posed more of a
restriction on the employment opportunities of blacks than
whites. Although title VII was intended to remove artificial restrictions put in the path of protected groups, the Court said
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a
job to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act
does not command that any person be hired simply because he
was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a
member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress
has proscribed. . . . The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
39. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 430 n.6, quoting, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
1960, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 35, Table 47.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 3
Because the testing and diploma requirement had been
adopted to "generally upgrade" the qualifications of the work
force, Duke Power could not show that they were related to the
performance of particular jobs at the plant." Although the lower
courts had not required a showing of job relatedness, it seems
unlikely that the company could produce such proof, at least for
the lower jobs. The next department up the ladder from the labor
department was coal handling, and it is probable that qualifications necessary for each were similar. Further, by requiring that
employers' tests be empirically validated, the Court made it clear
that the "business necessity" defense will not be sustained merely
on the basis of unsubstantiated company testimony. In Griggs the
only empirical evidence in the record indicated that those employees hired before 1955, who had not completed high school or
taken the tests, had performed satisfactorily and made progress
in the departments where the testing and diploma requirements
had subsequently been imposed.4 5
Several opinions rendered after Griggs permit further refinements of our insight into the meaning of the decision. If Griggs
establishes that a prima facie case would be made out by comparing minority and majority disqualification rates with respect to
particular employment requirements, then McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green" suggests that prima facie discrimination might
be proven merely by comparing protected class representation in
the general population with representation in the employer's
work force.4 7 Thus, the Green Court wrote: "The District Court
may, for example, determine, after reasonable discovery, that
'the [racial] composition of defendant's labor force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices.' See Blumrosen,
43. Id. at 430-31.
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id. at 431-32. The notion that tests must be validated, that is, finding an empirical basis for concluding that a good score on a test predicts good performance on the
job, originated in the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607 (1970). The Griggs Court, in applying a "great deference" standard to the Guidelines, not only firmly established the requirement of empirical validation but also made
the EEOC a credible force to be reckoned with by employers. See textual discussion at
notes 133-69 infra.
46. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. See Note, Employment Discrimination:Statistics and Preferences Under Title
VII, 49 VA. L. REv. 463 (1973).
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supra, at 92."11 The citation is to Professor Blumrosen's article,49
where, at the page cited by the Green Court, he rejects the notion
of limiting Griggs by requiring proof of differential impact of
particular practices:
This approach would produce the ultimate frustration of piecemeal litigation concerning the employer's hiring process, and
would require successive litigation over each stage in the hiring
and employment process. This result would stultify the implementation of title VII. It was carefully avoided by the Supreme
Court [in Griggs]."
Thus, Green may be read as approving, or at least as holding
open, prima facie proof of employment discrimination by a comparison between demographic statistics and the employer's work
force.
The preceding analysis is not undercut by the fact that the
Green Court, immediately after citing Blumrosen with apparent
approval, then warned: "We caution that such general determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in the
presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire."'" Presumably, the Court was thereby limiting the use of
such statistics in two ways. First, in line with Griggs, such data
is only prima facie proof and not conclusive.5 2 Secondly, the
Green Court was attempting to stress that making out a differential impact case does not necessarily establish illegal discrimination with respect to particular individuals. For example, although
an invalid test which disqualifies a number of blacks may be
enjoined, it does not necessarily follow that every black rejected
for failure to pass the test should receive back pay. Some employ48. 411 U.S. at 805 n.19.
49. Blumrosen, supra note 3.
50. Id. at 92.
51. 411 U.S. at 805 n.19.
52. Although the Green Court did not specifically advert to the case, Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), which presaged both Griggs and
Green, has been criticized for holding that demographic disparities with work force representation (in Parham,blacks constituted only 2% of the defendant's labor force in an area
where they comprised approximately 20% of the population), could establish discrimination conclusively. See Developments in the Law - Employment Discriminationand Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. R v. 1109, 1154 (1971). In light of that
criticism even the Eighth Circuit appears to have abandoned the use of demographic
statistics to establish discrimination per se. See Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office,
440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971), where particularly incriminating statistics were held to be
merely evidentiary. See also Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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ees may not be qualified for the job when judged under legitimate
non-discriminatory standards. In any event, it seems that the
qualifying language used by the Green Court does not mark a
retreat from its earlier suggestion that demographic data may be
used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Another case decided after Griggs and Green may also have
some effect on the use of generalized statistics showing differential impact on protected classes. In Espinoza v. FarahManufacturing Co.53 the Supreme Court held that the failure to hire a
person because she is not a United States citizen is not nationalorigin discrimination where it does not have the "purpose or effect" of discrimination on that basis. 4 In so holding, the Court
looked to employment statistics which showed that persons of
Mexican ancestry, all of whom were United States citizens, made
up more than 96 percent of the employees at the company's San
Antonio, Texas, plant. Without evidence of evil motive being
presented, the citizenship requirement could not be shown as
having national-origin discrimination as its purpose; and in view
of the employment data, there was no disproportionate impact.
Thus, the Court wrote:
While statistics such as these do not automatically shield an
employer from a charge of unlawful discrimination, the plain
fact of the matter is that Farah does not discriminate against

persons of Mexican national origin5 with respect to employment
in the job Mrs. Espinoza sought.1

The impact of Farahon the basic Griggs approach is unclear.
It could be taken to mean that the Griggs test has been tightened
to require a showing of differential impact at the particular employer's work place. Since such evidence will most likely be in the
control of the employer or unavailable as a result of inadequate
employer record-keeping, such an interpretation of the case
would make litigation substantially more difficult for plaintiffs.
An alternative, and better, view of Farah finds the plaintiff's
prima facie case established by a showing of differential impact
based on more general statistics, but allows a defendant to rebut
the case by showing that his work force differs from the general
distribution to such an extent that a particular practice used by
53. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
54. See text accompanying notes 99-101 infra.
55. 414 U.S. at 893.
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him has no differential impact.-5 1
The full effect of Green and Farah on the first step of the
Griggs test, the establishment of the prima facie case, remains
unclear. It is certain, however, that after Griggsthe courts readily
adopted the two-step test of discrimination, and that most subsequent litigation has been concerned with the defenses available
to employers after a prima facie case is made out. Unfortunately,
the Griggs opinion does not clearly define such defenses.
At one point the Court speaks of title VII barring "artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment,"5 thus perhaps implying that barriers which do not so qualify are legal. The
opinion, shortly thereafter, describes the "touchstone" of legality
as "business necessity." In the sentence immediately following,
however, the validating justification is formulated in terms of
being "related to job performance." Whether or not these constitute different standards remains unclear.
One of the first post-Griggs decisions to grapple with the
meaning of "business necessity" was Johnson v. Pike Corp. of
America,7 which took a very narrow view of the defense. A black
employee was discharged for violating a company rule proscribing
multiple garnishment of wages. The district court found that the
rule had not been adopted or applied out of discriminatory motives and that it had been applied equally to blacks and whites.
There was, therefore, no violation under the first two concepts of
discrimination. Relying on statistical data in published works,
however, the court found that the garnishment rule "discriminates against members of minority groups, in that it subjects a
disproportionate percentage of members of those groups to discharge from employment.""8 With differential impact demonstrated, the company was forced to establish "business necessity"
which the court considered limited to performance on the job.
The defense was not so broad as to include added employer expense or inconvenience connected with having the employee on
the payroll. In dictum the court suggested that an employer
would win if he proved that the employee had become less pro55.1. This was essentially the approach taken in Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co.,
381 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1974). See also Park v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 8 E.P.D.
9732 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 380 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Ala.
1974).
56. 401 U.S. at 431.
57. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
58. Id. at 494, relying on Western Center on Law and Poverty, Wage Garnishment,
Impact and Extent in Los Angeles County (1970); CAPLOvrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967).
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ductive because of the garnishment; the discharge would then be
for unproductiveness. 9 Johnson has been criticized as an overly
narrow reading of the Griggs business necessity test."0
The Fourth Circuit, in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,"' elaborated the factors that make up business necessity, and established a three-pronged test which, while quite stringent, is somewhat broader than that used in Johnson. Judge Sobeloff wrote for
a unanimous panel:
[The applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test is
whether there exists. an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged
practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is
alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish
the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well
with a lesser differential racial impact. "
Two prongs of this test are subject to little challenge. Few would
quarrel with the requirement that an employer demonstrate both
that the practice at issue actually furthers a legitimate business
purpose and that the absence of reasonably available alternatives
would achieve the same end with less racial impact . ' The main
difficulty arises with respect to the balancing test the court proposes-the impairment of the safe and efficient operation of the
business weighed against the racial impact. For example, if the
Robinson test were to be applied to the situation in Johnson, the
result is not clear. If the discharge rule saves employer's costs, at
least in administering wage garnishments, the amount of costs
saved must apparently be weighed against racial impact to determine whether the rule satisfies the "business necessity" standard.
While the balance is easy to state-the higher the costs and the
59. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
60. See Case Comment, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1482, 1488 (1972), which challenges Johnson
on the ground that it limits the defense to the efficient performance by an employee of
the particular tasks assigned to her or him rather than efficiency as measured by profitability per employee.
61. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
62. Id. at 798 (footnotes omitted).

62.1 The Robinson notion of no less restrictive alternative was endorsed, although
95
U.S. -,
without citation to that decision, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, S. Ct. 2362 (1975), and in a somewhat different fashion. See note 72.1 infra.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

lower the disproportionate impact, the more likely a court is to
find business necessity-it is impossible to currently provide a
more predictive rule where an employer's cost savings are at
issue.
Where a job involves high risks to the health and safety of
others, however, it seems that the burden on the employer to
show business justification is lessened. In Spurlock v. UnitedAirlines, Inc. 3 a black, with two years of college and 204 hours of
flight time, challenged United's minimum requirements for a
flight officer of 500 hours of flight time and a college degree.
Spurlock successfully established a prima facie case by showing
that, of the approximately 500 flight officers in the employ of
United, only nine were blacks. United was held to have rebutted
the plaintiff's case, however, by statistics purportedly showing a
direct correlation between numbers of flight hours and success in
the flight officers training pirogram." The college degree requirement was upheld by simple reliance on the testimony of company
officials that "the possession of a college degree indicated that the
applicant had the ability to understand and retain concepts and
information given in the atmosphere of a classroom or training
program."6 5 The court accepted United's case by establishing a
sliding burden of proof for business justification:
When a job requires a small amount of skill and training and
the consequences of hiring an unqualified applicant are insignificant, the courts should examine closely any pre-employment
standard or criteria which discriminates against minorities. In
such a case, the employer should have a heavy burden to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that his employment criteria
are job-related. On the other hand, when the job clearly requires
a high degree of skill and the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his
employment criteria are job-related. Cf. 29 C.F.R. §
63. 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
64. The cut-off line of 500 hours does not seem to be established by the statistics as
correct, They correlate as follows:
Failure Rate
No. of Hours
200 or less
9%
201 to 500
14%_
501 to 1000
8%_
1001 to 1500
5%_
1501 to 5000
2%
475 F.2d at 219.
65. Id.
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1607.5(c)(2)(iii). The job of airline flight officer is clearly such
a job. United's flight officers pilot aircraft worth as much as $20
million and transport as many as 300 passengers per flight. The
risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are staggering.
The public interest clearly lies in having the most highly qualified persons available to pilot airliners. The courts, therefore,
should proceed with great caution before requiring an employer
to lower his pre-employment standards for such a job. 6
This analysis leads to the ironic conclusion that, the higher the
risk connected with a job, the lower the burden of proof on the
employer to show that whatever qualifications it has imposed are
demonstrably related to the ability to perform that job. If at all
justified, this approach should be narrowly limited to jobs involving high risk to life and limb.67
In addition to these cases, two Supreme Court opinions considered previously are also relevant to the defenses available to
an employer. First, there is the implication derived from Farah
that an employer may show no differential impact. Secondly, and
more importantly, the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell
8 suggests either that business
Douglas Corp. v. Green"
necessity
may be broader than the Johnson or Robinson viewpoint or that
there exist employer defenses to discrimination charges in addition to a showing of business necessity. Green involved McDonnell Douglas' refusal to rehire a former employee because he had
been convicted of an unlawful "stall-in" and had engaged in an
unlawful "lock-in," both as part of a civil rights protest against
the employer. The stall-in involved the use of cars to block access
to the plant during rush hours while the lock-in consisted of padlocking the exits to the employer's office building. Green pleaded
guilty to obstructing traffic for the stall-in. He was not arrested
for the lock-in, although he was chairman of the group that conducted it and knew of the plan in advance. Shortly after these
events, the company advertised for mechanics. Green, who had
been a mechanic for the company until he had been laid off
(allegedly for economic reasons), applied but was rejected because of his participation in the stall-in and lock-in. The district
66. Id.
67. See also Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), where
the court used such an approach to justify an age limit on hiring bus drivers as a bona
fide occupational qualification exception to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1970). On the relationship between "business necessity" and
"bona fide occupational qualification" under title VII, See note 128 infra.
68. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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court had dismissed the case on procedural grounds; the Eighth
Circuit ultimately reversed on the procedural point, and, in ordering remand, focused on the scope of the employer's defense.
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Powell, the Supreme
Court attempted to resolve the difficulties of the lower courts by
defining "the order and allocation of proof in a private, singleplaintiff action challenging employment discrimination,"69 that
is, in individual employment decisions, not more or less general
practices:
The complainant in a title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs
to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications."
Green had made out a prima facie case: he was a black who had
performed satisfactorily as a McDonnell mechanic, and the job
remained open after the company had refused to rehire him. The
burden then shifted to the employer,
to articulatesome legitimate, nondiscriminatoryreason for the

employee's rejection. We need not attempt in the instant case
to detail every matter which fairly could be recognized as a
reasonable basis for refusal to hire. Here petitioner has assigned
respondent's participation in unlawful conduct against it as a
cause for his rejection. We think that this suffices to discharge
petitioner's burden of proof at this stage and to meet respondent's prima facie case of discrimination. 7
Thus, the Court held that the reasons advanced by the company
for not rehiring Green - participation in unlawful civil rights
tactics aimed at McDonnell - rebutted the plaintiffs prima
facie case. The Court then remanded on the ground that Green
could still prevail by showing that McDonnell Douglas' decision
was actually a pretext for a refusal to hire for discriminatory
reasons. The "pretext" notion clearly embraces "evil-motive"
discrimination. Green, who had protested his original layoff as
69. Id. at 800.
70. Id. at 802.
71. Id. at 802-03 (emphasis added).
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being racially discriminatory, might show that the company's
past treatment of him was discriminatory. Such a showing could
be made by introducing statements of management representatives that demonstrated racial prejudice. Green could also show
"pretext" in a more subtle manner by demonstrating that he had
not been treated equally, in that white employees who had engaged in unlawful acts against the employer of comparable seriousness were retained or rehired.72
Finally, and most interestingly, the Court indicated that evidence showing a Griggs-type case, a general pattern of disproportionate impact, would be relevant to the plaintiff's attempt to
prove pretext.72 1 Justice Powell states that "statistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may be helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire respondent in
this case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against
blacks."7 3 If the Court was speaking advisedly, the result of Green
is certainly startling - a defendant who, even-handedly and in
good faith, fires an employee for an objectively legitimate reason
may still be held to have acted only "pretextually" if he is guilty
of disproportionate impact discrimination in his general hiring
practices. Linguistically, it is odd in this situation to invalidate
an employer's action on the theory that it is a "pretext." Perhaps
even more odd is the inter-action of Green and Griggs. Suppose
Green is able to make out a Griggs case. Would he then be entitled to relief, including rehiring, even though the employer has a
reason for not rehiring him that was strong enough to rebut plain72. Id. at 804. Presumably, the most likely cases would arise from treatment of
employees involved in traditional union activities, including striking and picketing, in
furtherance of collective bargaining.
72.1. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, U.S. _
95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975), the
Supreme Court seemed to confirm the suggestion in Green that "pretext" is not necessarily an intent-oriented concept. The Court wrote:
If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are "job
related," it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve
the employer's legitimate interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship."
Such a showing would be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely
as a "pretext" for discrimination.
Id. at 2375 (citations omitted).
In addition to suggesting that "pretext" is a word of art, not necessarily linked to
"evil-motive" discrimination, this language apparently shifts the "less restrictive alternative" notion of Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 380 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Ala. 1974), see
note 62.1 supra, from an aspect of the employer's rebuttal case, see text accompanying
notes 62 and 62.1 supra, to the plaintiff's surrebuttal.
73. Id. at 805.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

tiffs prima facie case? Pushed far enough, such a rule would
mean that an employer guilty of Griggs-type discrimination could
not fire or refuse to hire any member of a protected class for any
reason whatsoever! That rule would, in turn, swallow Green itself
- no plaintiff would be foolish enough to bring a Green case when
a Griggs approach is available, as it often will be.
The Green opinion, by way of footnote, seemed to stop
short of such an absurd position. While authorizing the use of
statistics to support a finding that the racial "composition of
defendant's labor force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices,"7 the opinion cautioned that "such general
determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves
controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in
the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to
rehire."75 Apparently, making out a Griggs case will not by itself
surrebut McDonnell's rebuttal of Green's prima facie case. Instead, a Griggs case may be combined with other evidence that
might by itself be weak in order to establish pretext.
In any event Green clearly seems to establish an employer's
defense to Griggs-type cases, one that may not fit well within the
confines of the "business necessity" doctrine. Justice Powell, in
describing the scope of defenses available to the company, relied
on the disloyalty doctrine developed under the National Labor
Relations Act.76 NLRB v. Fansteel Corp.,77 set out the core
concept - an employer need not continue to employ persons who
had seized the employer's shop in what is determined to be an
illegal sit-down strike. The NLRA was not "intended to compel
employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their
unlawful conduct, to invest those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the
employer's property ..

*"78

Since Fansteel, the disloyalty doc-

trine has been developed to cover situations beyond physical violence aimed at the employer's property to include participation in
campaigns designed to disparage the employer's products or its
status in the community. The broadest scope given the disloyalty
defense is in NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard)."
74. Id. at 805 n.19, quoting, Blumrosen, Strangersin Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MIcH. L. REv. 59, 92 (1972).
75. 411 U.S. at 805 n.19.
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq.
77. 306 U.S. 240 (1939).

78. Id. at 255.
79. 346 U.S. 464 (1953).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/3

22

Sullivan and Zimmer: The South Carolina Human Affairs Law: Two Steps Forward, One Step
1975]
HUMAN AFFAIRS LAW

The unionized technicians of WBTV, Charlotte, N.C., picketed
the station in their off-duty hours to further their collective bargaining demands. They also distributed hand-bills which made
no reference to a labor controversy, union, or collective bargaining, but did attack the television station's lack of live local programing. The hand-bill intimated that the company gave Charlotte second-class service because the management considered
Charlotte a second-class city." The Supreme Court upheld the
discharge meted out to the participants saying, "There is no more
elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to
his employer." 8'
The possible extent of a title VII disloyalty test remains unclear in the light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization.82 In that case, the Court held that the National
Labor Relations Act does not protect concerted action by minority employees to bargain with their employer over questions relating to employment discrimination. In arguing for such a right, the
respondents urged that the non-retaliation section of title VII8
immunized this conduct from employer reprisals. The Court
avoided holding on this point by simply noting that, assuming the
employer's conduct violated title VII, appropriate remedies were
available under that statutory scheme. More significant for our
purposes than the result, however, was a footnote in the majority
opinion:
The question of whether § 704(a) is applicable to the facts of this
case is not as free from doubt as the respondents and amicus
would have it. In its brief the NLRB argues that § 704(a) is
directed at protecting access to the EEOC and federal courts.
Pettway v. American CastIron Pipe Co. We have previously had
occasion to note that "[n]othing in title VII compels an employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in ... delib-

erate, unlawful activity against it." McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green. Whether the protection afforded by § 704(a) extends
only to the right of access or well beyond it, however, is not a
question properly presented by this case.84
Western Addition, at the very least, holds open the question
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 468.
Id. at 472.
420 U.S. 50 (1975).
Id. at 4216.
Id. at 4221 (citations omitted).
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of whether lawful employee conduct opposing discrimination may
be punished under some approximation of the disloyalty doctrine.
While the significance of this will turn on future developments,
it is interesting to note Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, which examined the language of § 704(a) and concluded that "[by] distinguishing 'opposition' from participation in legal proceedings
brought pursuant to the statute, it would seem that Congress
brought employee self-help within the protection of § 704."85
The question remaining is how this disloyalty defense, whatever its scope, fits into the basic Griggs structure. There are several possible answers. First, that Green opened a wider range of
defenses for employers than just the Griggs "business necessity"
defense. The Court said that once a prima facie case had been
made out the "burden then must'shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for respondent's
rejection."8 6 As we have seen in Farah,7 one valid defense is a
showing of work force statistics that rebuts the more generalized
statistics establishing the prima facie case. Although Farahrepresents an instance where the defense must be based on hard
empirical data, the term "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
is not necessarily limited to such cases. The disloyalty doctrine
of Green need not be founded on empirical evidence, and time
and litigation may well add to the potential defenses available to
employers. The Green formulation may be read more narrowly,
however, as establishing a third step in a Griggs case, which
would be available to the employer only to limit the remedies
against it after losing the second step - the empirical defenses
established by Griggs and Farah. The Supreme Court laid the
foundation for such a distinction by distinguishing Green from
Griggs as a single-plaintiff action focusing on the plaintiff's conduct rather than on his status as a black or as a member of a class
protected by title VIJ. 5
A hypothetical may illuminate the importance of this distinction. Assume plaintiffs represent a protected class of blacks
and women in a Griggs style class action against an employer,
and assume further that they establish a prima facie case of dis85. Id. at 4222.
86. 411 U.S. at 802.
87. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
88. The Court further emphasized the individualized nature of the case by
distinguishing Green's conduct as unlawful conduct aimed at the employer rather than
unlawful conduct not directed against the particular employer. 411 U.S. at 803 n.17.
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crimination. If the employer can neither rebut with statistics like
those in Farahnor establish empirically a business justification
for the differential impact its policies have on protected groups,
the class is entitled to relief. Green, however, suggests that class
relief does not necessarily mean relief for every member of the
class. At this level, the employer can raise the Green defense as
to particular members to determine whether these individuals
should be denied relief because of their illegal conduct aimed at
the employer. 9 It is not clear what other individualized defenses
might be available to employers, but the possibilities are obvious.
For example, not every black who is barred by education or
testing requirements is qualified; therefore, an employer may be
able to avoid back pay liability as to those individuals who are
not qualified when assessed under legitimate, non-discriminatory
standards.
In sum, when viewed as a third step in the basic discrimination analysis, Green supports two policies of fair employment
legislation that otherwise might conflict. Griggs emphasized that
all "headwinds" to equal employment opportunity for women
and minorities ought to be removed unless justified under a strict
"business necessity" test involving empirical validation of the
"headwind." Limiting the scope of defenses available to employers facing Griggs-type class actions facilitates the removal of
those headwinds. Green, however, stresses that antidiscrimination legislation does not guarantee employment to anyone
merely by virtue of membership in a protected group. Rather,
these laws require that individuals be judged fairly on their own
abilities to be good employees.
One recent case illustrates the limited inroads Green has
made into the broad scope of Griggs. Wallace v. Debron Corp."
involved a discharge for excessive garnishment. The district court
dismissed the complaint analogizing the case to Green rather
than Griggs. In so doing, it read Green as establishing an employer defense whenever an employee voluntarily subjects himself
to a facially neutral rule adopted without "evil motive," even
though the rule has differential impact on a protected class and
has not been justified by a showing of "business necessity."9 ' The
89. Of course, Green adds a fourth step also. If an employer shows disloyalty, the
plaintiff still may establish pretext.
90. 363 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Mo. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 839. The district court's position was not without textual support in the
Green opinion. The Green Court, at one point, wrote:
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Eighth Circuit reversed, reading the case as within Griggs - a
class action which challenged a practice with a differential impact on blacks. The burden then shifted to the employer to prove
"business necessity," and the appeals court held that the defendant failed to meet that burden. 2 The employer argued that the
employee voluntarily undertook excessive credit obligations and
should have foreseen that garnishment was likely and, therefore,
the garnishment was voluntary. The court, however, refused to
view plaintiff's conduct in this manner. It found no evidence that
garnishments generally were the result of voluntary conduct undertaken with the knowledge of the consequences, and refused to
take judicial notice of that in view of contrary studies showing
that poverty is the root cause of garnishments. 3 The court then
remanded for trial on the issue of business justification, noting
that, for the employer to prevail, it must prove empirically the
actual impact of garnishment on employee productivity. Further,
the court held it must show there is no acceptable alternative to
attaining the goal as effectively with a lesser differential impact. 4
If, however, this proves an impossible burden (as would seem to
be the case), plaintiff and his class will be entitled to relief unless,
in accordance with our analysis of Green, the company can successfully resist relief in particular instances by showing a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason for firing Wallace or other class
But Griggs differs from the instant case in important respects. It dealt with
standardized testing devices which, however neutral on their face, operated to
exclude many blacks who were capable of performing effectively in the desired
positions. Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the
education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond
their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such
citizens for the remainder of their lives. [Citations omitted]. [Green], however, appears in different clothing. He had engaged in a seriously disruptive act
against the very one from whom he now seeks employment. And petitioner
[McDonnell Douglas] does not seek his exclusion on the basis of a testing
device which overstates what is necessary for competent performance, or
through some sweeping disqualification of all those with any past record of
unlawful behavior, however remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's
personal qualifications as an employee.
411 U.S. at 806 (emphasis added).
92. 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
93. Id. at 675, citing EEOC Decision No. 74-27, 2 CCH E.P.G. 6396, at 4061-62
(1973). Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit did not definitively reject a "volitional" exception
to Griggs. Although it refused to find garnishments voluntary, an exception may be made
for facially neutral conduct which impacts disproportionately on one protected class if
that class could easily avoid the impact by changing its conduct. This theory could explain
the hair cases, supra note 17, which are otherwise an anamoly in title VII jurisprudence.
94. Id. at 677.
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members. Presumably, this could be done by proving that
individual employees had become unproductive once garnished,
even though the company failed to establish that garnished employees were generally less productive.
While the basic structure of the Griggs definition of discrimination is now settled, several recent Supreme Court cases
demonstrate a tendency to limit the scope of title VII through
restrictive definitions of the classes protected by the law. These
cases may reopen avenues of defense thought closed by the
first substantive title VII case to reach the Supreme Court,
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.9 Martin Marietta had an employment policy excluding female applicants with pre-school age
children. Other females, and males with such children, were not
disqualified. Without considering whether such a policy might
be justified under the bona fide occupational qualification
exception, the Fifth Circuit upheld it as not involving sex discrimination under section 703(a):
A per se violation of the Act can only be discrimination based
solely on one of the categories, i.e., in the case of sex; women
vis-a-vis men. When another criterion of employment is added
to one of the classifications listed in the Act, there is no longer
apparent discrimination based solely on race, color, religion, sex
or national origin ....
...[Plaintiff] was not refused employment because she
was a woman nor because she had pre-school age children. It is
the coalescence of these two elements that denied her the position she desired."
Dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing, Chief
Judge Brown characterized the majority opinion as creating a
"sex plus" standard permitting the rankest sort of sex discrimination so long as sex is coupled with another fact. The company's
policy discriminated against women since all mothers were
women: "It is the fact of the person being a mother-i.e., a
woman-not the age of the children which denies employment
opportunity to a woman which is open to a man."97 In a per
curiam opinion, the Supreme Court accepted Chief Judge
Brown's position and reversed, remanding the case for determination of whether sex was a bona fide occupational qualification and
stating that
95. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
96. 411 F.2d 1, 3-4, rehearingdenied, 416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969).
97. 416 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex. The Court of Appeals therefore erred
in reading this section permitting one hiring policy for women
and another for men - each having pre-school-age children."
The first case raising the possibility of a retreat from Martin
Marietta is Espinoza v. FarahManufacturing Co., Inc.9 which
involved the question of whether the prohibition in section 703(a)
against national origin discrimination bars discrimination
against resident aliens who are not citizens of the United States.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall read the title VII prohibition against the background of federal enactments and Civil
Service regulations barring non-citizens from federal employment' 9 and concluded that Congress could not have intended to
require citizenship as a condition of federal employment while
barring private employers from doing likewise. Therefore, "national origin" did not include "citizenship" within its meaning.
In discussing the EEOC Guidelines on national origin discrimination which treat citizenship discrimination as national origin
bias,' 1 Justice Marshall agreed that discrimination on the basis
of national origin often would have the effect of discriminating on
the basis of citizenship. No such effect was present in the instant
case, however, since 96% of the company's San Antonio employees were of Mexican ancestry and the worker hired in place of
plaintiff was a citizen with a Spanish surname.
While Farah can be viewed as a rebirth of Martin Marietta
with "national origin plus noncitizenship" instead of "sex plus,"
there are at least two ways of avoiding such an interpretation.
First, countervailing federal policies, derived from other federal
statutes, underlie the implied exemption from title VII for citizenship discrimination. Such an exception, while not without
significance, will have limited implications considering the rarity
98. 400 U.S. at 544.
99. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
100. The Court relied in part on a policy statement against national origin discrimination in federal employment contained in section 701(b) of title VII in the light of an
enactment expressly barring the use of appropriations to pay non-citizens, Pub. L. No.
91-439, § 502, 84 Stat. 902 (1970); 5 C.F.R. § 388.101 (1972).
101. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1972) provides:
Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin, a lawfully immigrated alien who is domiciled
or residing in this country may not be discriminated against on the basis of his
citizenship ....
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of federal legislation explicitly mandating discrimination. Secondly, Farah can be easily reconciled with the Griggs analysis.
Justice Marshall was careful to state that the citizenship discrimination at issue did not have the "purpose or effect" of achieving
national origin discrimination. "Purpose" was not in issue since
the plaintiff did not claim "evil-motive"; and "effect" was not
established simply because the predominantly Mexican ancestry
composition of the employer's work force precluded finding the
Griggs requirement of a disproportionate impact. Presumably,
however, most citizenship discrimination litigated in the future
will have a disproportionate impact in terms of national origin,
and will not be saved by the Farahdoctrine.
The most recent case, Geduldig v. Aiello,1 12 however, is another matter. While not construing title VII, this decision could
have an impact on limiting the scope of the classes protected by
title VII. Geduldig involved an equal protection-based challenge
to a California law which provided benefits to wage earners to
cushion the economic effects of sickness or injury. Plaintiffs challenged the law's denial of compensation for disabilities suffered
in connection with a normal pregnancy. The Court, in an opinion
by Justice Stewart, utilized the rational relationship test usually
applied to economic and social welfare legislation subject to equal
protection challenge 13 and found the exclusion of pregnancy benefits valid. The plaintiffs argued that, since the classification
scheme was based on gender, stricter scrutiny was appropriate. 4
In a footnote, Justice Stewart denied that the classification was
gender-based:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does
not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification ....
Normal pregnancy is
an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving
pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable
basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition. The
102. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
103. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
104. They relied on the recent decisions in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1972) and

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as
such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most
cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into
two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. 05
While only Justice Douglas had dissented in Farah, in
Geduldig v. Aiello, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas
and Marshall, dissented, arguing that:
by singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard for disability compensation: a limitation is imposed upon
the disabilities for which women workers may recover, while
men receive full compensation for all disabilities suffered, including those that affect only or primarily their sex, such as
prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia and gout. In effect,
one set of rules is applied to females and another to males. Such
dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical
characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination.'
The implications of Geduldig for title VII remain unclear. As
an equal protection decision, the case is not directly apposite to
interpreting the statute. Nevertheless, the first lower court decision to consider a title VII pregnancy benefit case after Geduldig
found that the Supreme Court's decision required that the complaint be dismissed." 7 Although all subsequent court opinions
have gone the other way, including several opinions by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals,' it is apparent that a substantial di105. 417 U.S. at 497 n.20. The Court took a like tack in a case decided the same
day in which the constitutionality of the Indian preference for Bureau of Indian Affairs
jobs was upheld. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) the court again employed a
footnote to deny that the classification was a racial one:
The preference is not directed toward a "racial" group consisting of "Indians";
instead, it applies only to members of "federally recognized" tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as "Indians."
In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.
417 U.S. at 553 n.24.

106. 417 U.S. at 501.
107. Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 F. Supp.
679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). As this article goes to press, the Second Circuit has reversed the
lower court, holding that Geduldig does not provide for a title VII suit in these
circumstances. 9 E.P.D. 10035 (1975).
108. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
1989 (1975). Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 384 F. Supp. 765 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Vineyard v.
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lemma exists. On the one hand, it is difficult to believe that the
Supreme Court would sub silentio overrule Martin Marietta only
three years after that opinion was handed down. On the other
hand, however, reconciling Martin Mariettawith Geduldig is no
easy task. Indeed, only two approaches seem possible. First, the
dilemma might be avoided by focusing on the fact that, in one
sense, the pregnancy exclusion in Geduldig did not disproportionately disadvantage women; the Court noted that women were
already receiving more than their proportionate share of benefits
under the compensation scheme." 9 Accordingly, it may be that
the Court, looking at the compensation scheme as a whole rather
than separating out its component parts, found no discrimination
against women. Such a reading of Geduldig, although it clearly
opens up numerous problems in terms of balancing benefits and
detriments to determine if there is discrimination, at least has the
merit of preserving Martin Marietta.
Unfortunately, a serious objection to this reconciliation is
that Morton v. Mancari,10 handed down the same day as
Geduldig, took a similar view of what constitutes discrimination
without referring to counterbalancing factors. In Morton, the
Court upheld against a fifth amendment equal protection challenge a statutory provision creating a preference in certain government employment for Indians. Although the case can be otherwise rationalized, either by arguing that Indians are simply sui
generis, a point stressed in the opinion, or by contending that a
different standard applies to discriminations in favor of an oppressed group, it nevertheless seems significant that Justice
Blackmun's opinion devoted a footnote to demonstrating that
there was no racial discrimination at all:
The preference is not directed toward a "racial group" consisting of "Indians"; instead, it applies only to members of "federally recognized" tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as "Indians". In this sense,
the preference is political rather than racial in nature."'
Thus, as long as all women do not become pregnant and all IndiHollister Elementary School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Gilbert v. General
F.2d -,
10 E.P.D. 10,269 (4th Cir. 1975).
Electric Co., 109. The Supreme Court referred to the district court's finding that "women contribute 28 percent of the total disability insurance fund and received back about 38 percent
of the fund in benefits." 417 U.S. at 497 n.21.
110. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
111. Id. at n.24.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

31

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW RvIEw

[Vol. 27

ans are not preferred, there is not discrimination on sex or race
grounds.
If Morton, read together with Geduldig, precludes distinguishing Geduldig on the grounds that women as a class did not
suffer a disproportionate adverse impact from the California
compensation scheme, the question becomes how else to reconcile
the divergent results in Geduldig and Martin Marietta.The only
obvious answer is that "discrimination" means one thing under
title VII and quite another for equal protection clause purposes.
This is the view of several courts which have found title VII violations in post-Geduldig maternity-related cases. ' The courts,
however, have failed to elaborate on their reasoning, leaving us
with the question of why two schemes with much in common
should take such disparate approaches to the concept of discrimination.
Any definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of
the present study. Nevertheless, some initial, perhaps oversimplified, groping towards an answer may be appropriate here. It is
black-letter equal protection law that discrimination against certain groups ("suspect") or impinging on certain rights
("fundamental") invokes strict judicial scrutiny, which can perhaps be fairly characterized as prima facie unconstitutionality,
shifting the burden to the defendant to justify its actions by showing a "compelling state interest. 113 The question before us, therefore, is whether mere disproportionate impact should establish a
prima facie case, as in title VII, by triggering strict scrutiny, or
whether some other concept of discrimination is more appropriate.
Ultimately, the ease with which a prima facie case of illegality is made out under title VII may be justified by the fact that
the legitimacy of personnel policies can be ascertained by resort
to a touchstone which, whatever its complexities, is both obvious
and workable, i.e., "business necessity" or "job relatedness." As
discussed above, proving "business necessity" requires empirical
evidence beyond self-serving testimony of defendant's officials.
But, even under a strict reading, it is likely that in many
instances "business necessity" can be shown so that the plaintiff's prima facie case is rebutted. Establishing a "compelling
112. See note 108 supra. See also Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d
Cir. 1972).
113. See generally Developments in the Law - EqualProtection, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
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state interest," however, is more problematic. In fact, the initial
characterization that a statutory classification is "suspect" has
usually been determinative. Thus, the major instance where the
defense of "compelling state interest" has been established has
been the World War I Japanese exclusion cases that involved war
powers in what at the time was thought to be an extreme emergency. If the doctrine is so limited, it may be little more than
rhetoric attached to the conclusive judgment made when a classification is considered "suspect" or an interest "fundamental."
When compared with some real possibility of rebutting a title VII
prima facie case, the remote prospect of winning an equal protection challenge by showing a compelling state interest makes it
more questionable whether a prima facie case ought to be so
easily established using disproportionate impact analysis. It is, of
course, true that some equal protection cases, those involving
government employment, could be resolved by the incorporation
of title VII's "business necessity" doctrine as one wing of the
"compelling state interest" defense.' The Court, however, has
not yet generally recognized the utility of creating a spectrum of
equal protection analyses by carving out areas in which different
conduct will invoke different kinds of scrutiny.
Perhaps an illustration of the problems the Court may perceive in bringing disproportionate impact analysis into equal protection cases will be helpful. Suppose the Congress reinstitutes
military conscription together with a college student exemption.
If the effect is to disproportionately draft blacks, should the draft
law be prima facie unconstitutional by virtue of hurting a suspect
class? The answer may well depend on what it takes to establish
constitutionality, that is, a compelling state interest, but how a
court should go about this task is not at all apparent. Indeed,
the notion of disproportionate impact is so broad that importation of it into the general run of equal protection cases may mean
prima facie invalidity for most government actions.' 5
If disproportionate impact on a particular class does not by
itself render the governmental action suspect, the question re114. For an example of how a court distorted traditional equal protection analysis in
order to reach, in the context of government employment, the same result as title VII
demands in the private sector, see Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir.
1972).
115. E.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972). But see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 n.19, which suggests an equal
protection analysis akin to title VII. See generally Goodman, DeFactoSchool Segregation:
A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CALF. L. Rav. 275, 300-07 (1972).
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mains what concept of discrimination is to be used for equal
protection purposes. Although this issue must be left unresolved,
Geduldig and Morton pose serious problems for forging the
constitutional definition of discrimination. It is not at all clear
why the statutes at issue there did not satisfy either an "evilmotive" or an "unequal treatment" model.
If Geduldig cannot be limited in the fashion described above,
the Court's approach could have serious consequences limiting
the scope of the other protected classes. For example, the opinion
might justify a benefit program excluding compensation for
sickle-cell anemia on the ground that a classification based on
those with sickle-cell anemia is not a racial classification since
not all blacks suffer from the disease. Thus, the return to Martin
Marietta would be complete. "Sex plus pregnancy" is not a sex
classification and race plus sickle-cell anemia is not race discrimination. As long as a classification is not entirely coextensive with
a protected class, it could be upheld even though it affects only
members of protected classes. From a class perspective, each
member of a protected class is affected at least by the potential
that she or he will come to fall within the "plus" category.
In summary, although many basic title VII issues remain
murky, some conclusions can safely be drawn. Thus, the statute's
definition of discrimination includes "evil-motive," "equal treatment" and "differential impact" methods of analysis. Differential impact discrimination, as set out in Griggs and refined by
Green and Farah, includes at least three litigation steps: (1)
Plaintiff's prima facie case may be made out with demographic
statistics, showing significantly lower representation of protected
classes in the employer's work force than in society, or comparative statistics that point to an employer's practices as the cause
of differential impact on employment opportunities for protected
classes. (2) The prima facie case may be rebutted if the employer
can show statistics rebutting plaintiff's statistics or demonstrate,
again through hard empirical data, that the employer's practices
causing the differential impact are justified by business necessity.
Even if unsuccessful in rebutting plaintiff's class-wide case, the
employer can try to avoid liabilities to individual members of the
class who have been disloyal or should not be hired for other
"legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons." (3) Finally, such individual members may still win relief if they can show, through
assembling evidence tending to show discrimination under any
definition, that the reasons advanced for the employer's conduct
were pretexts hiding discriminatory reasons.
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B. Statutory Exceptions to Title VII and the Human Affairs
Law
The problems of defining the nature of discrimination seem
to be far more intractable than those involved in interpreting the
statutory exceptions, although the drafters of title VII may have
expected precisely the opposite. In title VII jurisprudence, however, it appears that the major thrust has been to determine the
basic purpose of the anti-discrimination measure, and then to
limit the exceptions so they do not defeat that purpose. This
clearly emerges from a review of the major exceptions to title VII
- the bona fide occupational exception (BFOQ), the professional
testing exception and the bona fide seniority exception, all of
which are incorporated in the South Carolina Human Affairs
Law.
1. Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications (BFOQ)
Section 703(e)(1) sets out the BFOQ exception.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees ....

on the basis of ...

religion, sex, or

national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .

.

. .,t

Note that race and color cannot be bona fide occupational qualifications. 17 Section 8(c)(1) of the South Carolina Human Affairs

Law goes further than title VII. First, it removes religion as a
basis for BFOQ, and secondly, it deletes the word "reasonably"
before "necessary," thus presumably stating a somewhat higher
standard for establishing a BFOQ."5 That distinction, however,
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1974).
117. Precisely how the limitation of BFOQ to religion, sex and national origin works
in view of the Griggs differential impact standard is not clear. Consider, for instance, a
requirement that the Marshal of the Saint Patrick's Day Parade be of Irish origin. Assuming BFOQ is made out, the requirement is legal vis-a-vis, say, a person of Italian ancestry.
The rule, however, plainly disqualifies blacks disproportionately, and race cannot be
BFOQ. The question, therefore, is whether the statute should be construed to reach the
odd result of allowing either an Irishman or a black (or other racial minority) to be
marshal, or whether the courts should read the BFOQ broadly enough to bar non-Irish
blacks also, even though the BFOQ provision does not by its terms extend to race?
118. "To bar or refuse to hire or employ any individual because of such individual's
sex or national origin in those certain instances where sex or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification necessary to the normal operation of the particular agency or
department concerned.
... S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.28(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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may be of no great consequence since title VII law relating to the
BFOQ defense already established a strict standard. Such a view
is taken by the EEOC Guidelines," 9 and, more importantly, has
been almost uniformly adopted by the courts. The starting point
2 0 where the Supreme Court, alis Phillips v. Martin Marietta,'
though reversing the Fifth Circuit's narrow definition of sex discrimination, remanded to determine whether the requirement
that women employees not have pre-school children was a BFOQ.
In language that at least recognized the possibility of a broad
interpretation, the per curiam opinion stated that:
The existence of such conflicting family obligations if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than a
man, could arguably be a basis for distinction under § 703(e) of
the Act. But that is a matter of evidence tending to show that
the condition in question "is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.""'
Concurring with the Court's decision, Justice Marshall disagreed
with the terms of remand, claiming that it opened the door for
too broad an interpretation of the BFOQ exception.
119. Sex as Bona Fide Occupational Qualification. - (a) The Commission believes
that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted
narrowly. Labels - "men's jobs" and "women's jobs" - tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of
the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For example,
the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable
of assembling intricate equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive
salesmanship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be
considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any
characteristics generally attributed to the group.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of co-workers,
the employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the
Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g.,
an actor or actress.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1972). The EEOC National Origin Discrimination Guidelines, 29
C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1972), indicate only that, "the bona fide occupational qualification exception as it pertains to national origin cases shall be strictly construed."
The Religious Discrimination Guidelines of the EEOC, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1972), do
not mention the BFOQ.
120. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra.
121. Id. at 544.
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The Supreme Court has not again been faced with the issue,
but the lower federal courts have generally preferred Marshall's
more restrictive approach. The seminal case, one which predates
Martin Marietta, is Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone Co.'
where the company excluded women from the position of switchman because the job was "too strenuous." In striking down the
company rule, the Fifth Circuit set out the test to be applied:
[W]e hold that in order to rely on the bona fide occupational
qualification exception an employer has the burden of proving
that he has reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis
for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. 1'
The court concluded that the company had failed to carry its
burden of proof since it had relied on the stereotyped characterization that few or no women could do the lifting involved while
treating all men as if they could.
While the Weeks test of requiring the employer to produce

evidence that all or substantially all women are unable to perform
the job is quite restricted, subsequent litigation pushed the Fifth
Circuit to read the BFOQ exception even more narrowly. In Diaz
v. Pan American Airways, Inc.,124 the challenge was to the airline's policy excluding men from flight attendant jobs. Using an
elaborate litigation strategy to bring the exclusion within the
Weeks test, the airline tried to show that only women could perform the psychological stroking necessary to soothe the anxieties
of airline passengers. Pan Am introduced evidence of a survey
indicating that 79% of all passengers, male and female, preferred
being served by female stewardesses and then attempted to prove
that such customer preference was based on "feminine" qualities
that few, if any, males possessed. A well known psychiatrist and
popularizer of psychiatry, Dr. Eric Berne, 125 testified that an airplane ("sealed enclave") in flight ("levitated off the ground and
transported through the atmosphere at high speed") is a special
psychological environment producing sensations of apprehension,
boredom and excitement. In such a stressful situation, male passengers would resent a male steward who was coping better and
122. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
123. Id. at 235.
124. 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970).

125. Author of

GAMES PEOPLE PLAY
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therefore appeared more masculine; however, they also would
resent a male attendant who appeared less masculine. Further,
by providing fuel for the fires of male passengers' sexual fantasies,
female attendants would cause them to feel at ease. Even female
passengers benefit since they might feel negatively toward their
own sexual fantasies involving male attendants but would enjoy
the companionship of another woman.' 2 5'. Further, a psychologist
experienced in psychological testing, Dr. Raymond A. Ratzell,
testified that, in the intangible, interpersonal relationship aspects of the job of flight attendant, characteristics that
psychologists depict as "feminine" - benevolence, genuine interest in the comfort of others, passivity - appear more often in
females than in males. Thus, "it would be quite infrequent to find
a man possessing each of these traits to at least as high a degree
as the average woman. '2 6
Not surprisingly, considering the heavily loaded record before it, the district court bought Pan Am's argument and concluded that "all or substantially all" men were unable to perform
the work of flight attendants. The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed, holding the word "necessary" in section 703(e) requires
the employer to prove that use of sex as a classification device is
a business necessity, "that is to say, discrimination based on sex
is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.' 27 The
court then held that the essence of the airline function was to
transport passengers safely from point to point. The nonmechanical, psychologically-stroking elements of the flight
attendant job, therefore, are not essential to the airline's business
nor to the job of flight attendant. Because these aspects are only
tangential to the essence of the airline business, Pan Am failed
to meet its burden of showing a business necessity even though
it had showed that all, or substantially, all males could not perform these tangential functions. While the employer can take into
account the ability of individuals to perform these nonmechanical functions, it cannot use a sexual classification to ex2
clude all males from the job.' 1
125.1. Contra, E. JONG, FEAR OF FLYING (1974).
126. 311 F. Supp. at 567.
127. 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis in original). This approach may have
been pushed even further in the South Carolina BFOQ exception by the deletion of the
word "reasonable" from the statutory standard. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
128. The relationship between BFOQ and business necessity as defenses to prima
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Even more restrictive of BFOQ is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co. '2 There, the railroad

refused a woman the job of agent-telegrapher on the ground that
women were not generally physically or biologically suited for
strenuous jobs in terms of hours worked and physical activity
required. Citing the EEOC Guidelines'30 for the proposition that
the BFOQ is a narrow exception to the rule against sex discrimination, the court indicated that the only question was whether
the job required a person with a physical characteristic unique to
one sex, for example, a wet nurse or sperm donor, or whether a
member of one sex was necessary to guarantee authenticity or
genuineness, e.g., an actor, actress or model. The court held that,
"sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that might, to
one degree or another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the
basis for the application of the BFOQ exception.'

3'

Since the

railroad had failed to show the agent-telegrapher job required
sexual characteristics unique to men, it could not rely on the
BFOQ to exclude all women. Rather, the railroad was required
to place men and women applicants on equal footing: Equality
of footing is established only if employees otherwise entitled to
the position, whether male or female, are excluded only upon a
32
showing of individual incapacity.'

2. Employment Testing
Another potentially important exception to title VII authorizes the use of professionally developed employment tests. It is
not
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and
to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability
test provided that such test, its administration or action upon
the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' 33
facie cases of discrimination would seem to be quite close after Diaz so that decisions on
either would seem to be at least persuasive with respect to the other. BFOQ is, of course,
narrower than business necessity insofar as it is limited to sex, national origin and religion.
But see note 117 supra. It is, however, perhaps also broader than business necessity in
the sense that it clearly can be used to justify facially discriminatory practices while
business necessity may be limited to disproportionate impact cases like Griggs.
129. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
130. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1972).
131. 444 F.2d at 1225.
132. Id.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1974).
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The Supreme Court definitively interpreted this section in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.,' 34 holding that tests which have a discriminatory impact may be used only if they are validated, that is, proven
by empirical methods to be related to job performance. In the
course of reaching this conclusion, the Court cited with approval

the EEOC Guidelines on testing which establish rigorous standards for validating employment tests. 35' The South Carolina
Human Affairs Law, which was drafted after Griggs, codified the
requirement that employment tests be job related. Thus, Section
360.78(c) (3) provides that it is not an unfair discriminatory practice
[T]o give and act upon the results of any test; provided, that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not
designed or intended to discriminate because of race, creed,
color, sex, age, or national origin and that such test measures
abilitites or other factors necessary to successful performance
of the job for which an individual has applied and is being
tested or of the job next higher in the ordinary line of promotion
or of the job to which an employee is being considered for promotion. , 0
Although a detailed consideration of the problems connected with
test validation is beyond the scope of this article,'37 a brief sketch
of some of the concepts involved may provide an insight into the
possible implications of the South Carolina statute. Since tests
continue to be widely used in government employment, the topic
is a timely one.13
134. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
135. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1970).
136. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.28(c)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
137. See generally Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under FairEmployment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1598 (1969); Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in
Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 691 (1968); Note, Application of the
EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation:A Uniform Standardfor Both Public
and Private Employers, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 505 (1972); Wilson, A Second Look at
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination,and the Role of
the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REv. 844 (1972); Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 72 COLUM. L. REv. 900 (1972).
138. Among local governmental units, testing remains a significant tool for employee
selection. At present, at least one federal suit has been filed against alleged discriminatory
practices, including testing, on the local level. Gathers v. County Council of Charleston,
Civil No. 74-1474 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 9, 1974). On the state level, a single inter-agency
cooperation system administers tests for a number of state agencies, including: Department of Social Services, Employment Security Commission, Department of Health and
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Environment Control, Council on Aging, Civil Defense Commission, Commission on Mental Health Services, Commission on Alcoholism, Department of Labor, and Department
of Mental Retardation. In addition, the Highway Patrol administers its own tests designed
to predict success of applicants at the Criminal Justice Academy. Interview with Paul
Beasley, head of Technical Services at the Human Affairs Commission, January 7, 1975.
Of course, no opinion is intimated here about the legality of such tests, either under title
VII or the Human Affairs Law.
Another employment-related test which may be subject to attack under the Human
Affairs Law is the National Teachers Examination (NTE). The South Carolina State
Board of Education currently has two policies in effect governing certification of teachers.
Both look to test scores from the NTE which is composed of two parts, a Commons
Examination and an Area Examination. Generally speaking, under the pre-1969 certification policy, the eligibility requirements for a teaching certificate were (a) possession of a
bachelor's degree or (b) completion of three years of college and a score of 500 or better
on the Commons Examination. Teachers who were issued a certificate prior to July 1, 1969
received a graded certificate based upon their score (500 = A; 425-499 = B; 375-424 = C;
331-374 = D). Under the post-1969 certification policy, test scores are also utilized. In
order to obtain a "Professional Certificate," the teacher must earn a composite score of
975 on the Commons and Area tests with a minimum score of 450 on each part. A "Warranty" can be obtained if the teacher earns a composite score of 850, and a minimum of
400 on each.
Although possession of either type of certificate allows the individual to teach in
South Carolina public schools, the advantages of obtaining a Professional Certificate
rather than a Warranty are significant. The Professional Certificate is indefinitely valid
while the Warranty is good only five years. Failure to obtain a Professional Certificate by
the expiration of that time subjects the teacher to termination; and, even if the teacher's
employment is continued on an "emergency" basis, her or his pay grade is frozen at four
years experience. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-258 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
For those teachers who were certified under the pre-1969 policy, it is possible to obtain
a Professional Certificate if previous test scores meet the new requirement. It is likely,
however, that only those who qualified as an "A" teacher or a high "B" will qualify.
Further, those teachers who previously taught with a "C" or a "D" NTE rating are no
longer hired, and in fact have often been dismissed in spite of many years of experience.
The Human Affairs Commission believes that the effect of these requirements has
been to impact disproportionately on black teachers, and the validity of the NTE has yet
to be determined. "Analysis of National Teachers Examinations as Used in South Carolina" (Commission internal document). Both the NEA and the SCEA have decried the
continued use of NTE in South Carolina, citing among other reasons its disproportionate
impact on black and minority teachers.
Assuming that current use of the NTE in South Carolina has a disproportionate racial
impact, and that it has not been validated as job related, the question remains of the legal
implications of the present practice. To begin with, it would seem that the State Board
of Education's policies are subject to constitutional attack. Courts have employed the
equal protection clause to strike down apparently analogous uses of the NTE by school
districts in their personnel decisions; see Walston v. Nansemond County School Board,
492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974); Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School District, 462
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1972); no reason appears why these holdings would not invalidate State
Board certification regulations having the same effect. Further, under the assumed facts,
title VII illegality seems likely with respect to individual school districts utilizing the
certification requirements in their personnel policies. Were a state law to limit hiring only
to those certified, the result would not change since it is settled that, by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, title VII supercedes inconsistent state laws. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). Finally, the legal situation under the Human
Affairs Law would seem identical if school districts are subject to the commission's coer-
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Employment tests run the gamut from narrow skills tests,
such as welding or typing, which approach a trial run on the
actual job, to highly abstract and academic tests of general "intelligence."' 3 9 As the tests approach the more abstract "IQ" tests,
there is overwhelming evidence that, on the average, blacks and
other disadvantaged groups currently achieve substantially lower
scores than whites. Crucial factors in performance include the
quality and extent of past schooling and the applicant's cultural
background.'40 Of course, to the extent that such factors as these
cive jurisdiction. No argument of an implied statutory exception to the law on the state
level can be made out, since no statute explicitly requires use of the NTE in the manner
presently prescribed by the State Board, although one provision generally delegates the
certification process to that body. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-45(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
139. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 137, at 1639; J. KIRKPATRICK, R. EWEN, R. BARRETT
& R. KATZELL, TESTING AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT 5 (1968). In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 478 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
the court said:
It used to be the prevailing theory that aptitude tests - or "intelligence" tests
as they are often called, although the term is obviously misleading - do measure some stable, predetermined intellectual process that can be isolated and
called intelligence. Today modem experts in educational testing and psychology
have rejected this concept as false. . . . In other words, an aptitude test is
necessarily measuring a student's background, his environment. It is a test of
his cumulative experiences in his home, his community and his school.
Even authorities who consider inheritance an important factor in determining test scores
acknowledge the importance of environment. See Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ
and ScholasticAchievement?, 39 HARv.EDUC. REV. 37-41, 44-45, 79-80 (1969).
140. See, e.g., Note, Legal Implicationsof the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in
Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968). There are those who believe
that the use of unvalidated tests often shows an intent to discriminate against blacks.
They can point both to the origin of intelligence testing and to the rise in employment
testing following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thus, it has been argued that
the general intelligence tests used in the United States were developed by industrial
psychologists who followed the English school of testing, founded by Sir Francis Galton,
Darwin's cousin, and his protege, Sir Cyril Burt. The purpose of Galton and Burt was to
improve bloodlines by encouraging the upper classes to breed while sterilizing the unfit;
unfitness was, of course, to be determined by tests. In the American setting, this elitist
bias became profoundly racist. Koenig, They Just Changed the Rules on How to Get
Ahead, 8 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 87, 100 (June 1974). Even if we reject this "taint of ancestry"
approach to assess the purposes of testing, more recent developments suggest that the
decision to use tests is sometimes motivated by racial prejudices. Koenig states that after
1964 test sales "zoomed," supra at 89. This fact, of course, can be explained without
presuming an evil motive; for example, an employer eager to comply with federal law
might utilize tests to minimize subjective evaluations which he feels may be vulnerable
to title VII attack. Nevertheless, the use of tests after 1964 where none were used before,
in light of general knowledge that these tests will screen out more blacks than whites, at
least raises suspicions about the purity of the employer's motives. In any event, speculation about the motives of those who use tests is now irrelevant in light of the Griggs holding
that it is the discriminatory effect that is critical. The only conceivable exception, however
unlikely, would exist when a test validated as job-related is used, not because it is an
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are important factors in job performance, a test which separates
the haves from the have-nots is a legitimate screening device. As
Judge Sobeloff has suggested, a typist who cannot type need not
be hired, regardless of the source of his or her deficiencies."' Discriminatory effects from such tests will remain; remedying these
problems is the province of societal and legal mechanisms other
than title VII. Although a correlation between test performance
and job performance validates tests with discriminatory effects,
the problem remains how such a correlation may be proven. In
this connection, perhaps the most striking aspect of testing is the
general pre-Griggs failure of American industry to validate tests
by proving such a correlation, a failure which has not yet been
significantly corrected."'
Although there has been criticism of presently accepted validating techniques,"' the EEOC Guidelines have accepted them
by looking to validation methods adopted by the American Psychological Association.4 The heart of the EEOC standards is the
requirement that tests be validated by empirical studies. There
are two basic approaches to test validation, "empirical," or
criterion-related, and "rational." Under the EEOC Guidelines,
the preferred method is by criterion-related study,'45 since resort
to rational validation is permissible only when the criterionrelated approach is not feasible.4 Under the criterion method,
accurate predictor, but only because it has a discriminatory impact. Such a situation
would presumably fall within the pretext notion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), discussed at notes 71-7.5 supra.
141. Dissenting in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1237 (4th Cir.), rev'd,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
142. See Koenig, supra note 140, at 90-91.
143. See McClelland, Testing for Competence Rather Than for "Intelligence," 28
AMER. PSYCH. 1 (Jan. 1973), who notes that present tests merely reinforce the traditional
categorization of white males because of their high "fit-in" factor among fellow employees
and customers. Sidney Fine, senior staff member of the Upjon Institute for Employment
Research, Washington, D.C., as quoted in Koenig, supra note 140, at 102-03, believes the
assumptions of test validation are faulty. First, the criteria for job performance, even on
the same machine or in jobs with the same job titles, are not standard. Secondly, job
ratings usually depend on a supervisor's view of how well the employee adapts his or her
behavior to the social situation on the job rather than the functional skills needed.
144. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS AND MANUALS (1974).

145. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1970).
146. Id. One exception to this is specified: "content validity alone may be acceptable
for well-developed tests that consist of suitable samples of the essential knowledge, skills
or behaviors comprising the job in question." Id. "Technical feasibility" is defined by the
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(b), 1607.5(c) (1970).
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the author of the test first makes a careful analysis of all the skills
and traits necessary for adequate job performance;'4 7 he then develops a test to measure those skills and traits. In the title VII
context, however, some items cannot properly be included as performance criteria even if they actually affect performance. Thus,
14 8
ability to appease discriminatory attitudes of other employees
or of customers' is not an appropriate criterion.
The next step is the most critical: relating test results to onthe-job performance. Ideally, the predictive method should be
used if possible. In this method the employer chooses a group of
applicants "representative of the normal or typical candidate
group for the job""' .(including the relevant minority population).
He then tests the applicants under controlled and standardized
conditions,' 5 ' hires all of them and later compares test results
with job performance. In making such a comparison, it is essential to monitor very carefully the assessments that are made of
job performance. While some measures, such as that of productivity, may be objectively verified,'5 - subjective assessments by
supervisors can reinforce discriminatory stereotypes. For example, in Rowe v. General Motors Corp.," the employer was found
to have violated title VII by its promotion procedures because a
foreman's recommendation was an indispensable prerequisite
and the standard to be used - "ability, merit and capacity" was found to be vague and subjective.'54
On the basis of the collected data, correlation coefficients are
constructed which express the relationship between test scores
and job performance on a scale between -1.00, perfect negative
relation, to +1.00, perfect positive relation. Normally, a coefficient of .60 is considered high, but the coefficient in employment
147. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3) (1970).
148. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Local
189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
149. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Sprogis
v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
150. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(1) (1970).
151. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(2) (1970).
152. But see Taylor v. Safeway Foods, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 468 (D. Colo. 1973), where
a supervisor's prejudice was found to have adversely affected the production of a black
employee.
153. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). The Guidelines address this issue at 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5(b)(4) (1970).
154. 457 F.2d at 358.
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testing rarely exceeds .40.111 The resultant coefficient must then
be assessed in terms of its utility. According to the Guidelines,
this requires a demonstration of statistical significance "between
the test and at least one relevant criterion." 5 ' Statistical significance is defined as a 95% level of confidence, that is, that the
probabilities are 1 in 20, or less, that the results could have occurred by chance.1 5 7 Even if statistical significance is shown, however, the Guidelines impose one further requirement: the test
must also be shown to have practical usefulness or value, 58' which
requires a balancing of certain factors. These include: the extent
of statistical correlation, the importance to the job of the performance criteria tested, whether the test is used to screen out a few
incompetents or to screen in a few prime candidates, and the
proportion of applicants who are successful employees when not
selected on the basis of the test. 5 '
Such a predictive validation study will be onerous for all
employers, but it will be impossible for some. For example,
smaller firms may not have enough new employees to generate
statistically significant data. Or, an employer might have a job
slot where the consequences of employee mistakes are too severe
to permit indiscriminate hiring merely to obtain data for test
validation. In such cases, resort may be had to the second, "concurrent," version of empirical validation. The only difference between concurrent and predictive validation is that in the former
incumbent employees are tested instead of job applicants. Although obviously easier than the predictive approach, concurrent
validation has at least two major shortcomings. First, to the extent that job performance increases ability to perform on the test,
the results will overstate the correlation; secondly, in the discrimination context, most employers will have disproportionately few
black workers. Therefore, the sample may not include a sufficient
number of minority populations to make a typical or normal sam155. Note, Legal Implications of the Use of StandardizedAbility Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 691, 699-700 (1968).
156. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(1) (1970).

157. Id.
158. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(2) (1970).

159. The Guidelines actually suggest that even a test validated in accordance with
the standards established may be illegal when it has a disproportionate impact on a
protected group since in such cases a further showing is required that the employer "dem-

onstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are unavailable." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1970).
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ple.'5 5 This poses a serious problem in view of the notion of differential validity which posits that tests may have validity at different levels for different cultural groups. Although the hypothesis
of differential validity has been criticized,"' and certainly has yet
to be recognized as established, it has been incorporated into the
EEOC Guidelines' 2 and accepted as a reasonable requirement by
at least one circuit court.'63 Accordingly, it would seem advisable
for employers to use differential validation whenever a criterionrelated study, whether predictive or concurrent, is conducted and
when differential validation is technically feasible.' 4
When neither criterion approach is technically feasible,
usually for lack of an adequate sample, the employer may fall
back on the two "rational" methods. One is the "content" test,
which in some circumstances may actually be superior to the
criterion approach.'6 5 Content validation consists of job-sample
testing, such as typing for a typist. To the extent that the test
accurately reflects representative tasks done on the job, it may
be very useful. The "construct" method, on the other hand, is the
least reliable form of testing validation, approaching, as it does,
mere expert opinion. This validation technique consists of an
expert's first defining certain job-related skills and traits and
then attempting to create a test which will select for them.
A good illustration of the kinds of practicability problems
involved in validating tests can be seen in United States v. Georgia Power Co.,' the most comprehensive discussion of testing by
a court since Griggs. The former case demonstrates the difficulty
of litigating testing issues and the multiple bases for challenge.
While Griggs established that employment tests must be job related, if shown to have a differential impact on protected classes,
160. A typical or normal sample is required by the Guidelines. 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5(b)(1) (1970).
161. Gardner, Development of the Substantive Principles of Title VI Law: The Defendant's View, 26 ALA. L. REV. 1, 64-69 (1973).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(a) & § 1607.5(b)(5) (1970). The theory underlying the notion
of differential validity is sketched in Cooper & Sobol, supranote 137, at 1644-46. See also
Note, Legal Implications of the Use of StandardizedAbility Tests in Employment and
Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 700-06 (1968).
163. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
164. The Guidelines permit validation even where differential validation is not technically feasible. But this "does not relieve any person of his subsequent obligation for
validation when inclusion of a minority candidate becomes technically feasible." 29
C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(1) (1970).
165. See note 146 supra.
166. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Georgia Power dealt with the next step, how an employer may
prove tests to be job related. In so doing, the court established a
standard of deference to be applied to the EEOC Guidelines:
[The Griggs] requirement to treat the guidelines as expressing
Congressional intent obviously was intended as an answer to the
question at issue in Griggs - when can tests, which are shown
to have discriminatory results, be used? We view the reference
by the Griggs court to EEOC Guidelines as an adjunct to the
ultimate conclusion that such tests must be demonstrated to be
job related. We do not read Griggs as requiring compliance by
every employer with each technical form of validation set out in
29 C.F.R. Part 1607. Nevertheless, these guidelines undeniably
provide a valid framework for determining whether a validation
study manifests that a particular test predicts reasonable job
suitability. Their guidance value is such that we hold they
should be followed absent a showing that some cogent reason
exists for noncompliance.' 7
The tests involved included the Bennett Mechanical and
Wonderlic, both of which were used in Griggs, plus the PTI Verbal and Numerical tests. The district court had found a differential impact, so the burden shifted to the employer to establish
validity. The company undertook to carry this burden by the use
of an expert, Dr. Hite, who set up a validation study. Rather than
a predictive study, Hite used concurrent validation, utilizing a
representative sample of current employees. He found a positive
relationship between job performance and test scores.
Concurrent validation is authorized by the EEOC Guidelines
where the sample tested is representative of minority groups currently in the applicant population. The circuit court, however,
found that method unsatisfactory where plaintiffs' prima facie
case had established that blacks had been denied jobs and, therefore, entry into the test validation sample, because of poor performance on the tests. Thus, Hite's sample failed to include the
40% of applicants who failed the test, which group included almost all of the blacks. The Fifth Circuit committed itself to the
Guidelines' requirement that tests be separately validated for
minority and majority groups. With an applicant population onethird black, the employer could have tried differential validation.
The court also found other reasons for holding that Georgia Power
had not carried its burden, including the failure to administer the
167. Id. at 913.
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tests under uniform conditions and the fact that Hite's study had
used a validation strategy that did not use the test scores in the
same way that the company did in hiring.
The Fourth Circuit took a similar approach in Moody v.
Albemarle PaperCo.,16 where it found an attempt at concurrent
validation inadequate for a number of reasons. These included
the fact that job performance was measured by "possibly subjective ratings of supervisors who were given a vague standard by
which to judge job performance.""1 9 Secondly, the testing procedure had erroneously been approved by the district court for lines
of progression in which there had been neither a validation study
nor job analysis to demonstrate the absence of significant differences in these lines and those that were studied. Thirdly, the
district court wrongly allowed the use of two tests where only one
at most had been validated. In the course of its opinion the court
relied heavily on the EEOC Guidelines.
This sketch of title VII developments in the testing area suggests that a rigorous standard is expected to be applied, not only
under the federal statute but also under the South Carolina
Human Affairs Law, which was obviously drafted to incorporate
the main themes of title VII. Most significantly, the EEOC
Guidelines, which were approved by the Supreme Court in Griggs
prior to the drafting of the South Carolina statute, can be expected to be at least persuasive on the validation issue, and it
may not be inaccurate to conclude that they were indirectly incorporated into the Human Affairs Law simply by looking to the
legal context in which the state testing exemption arose.*
168. 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated and rem.

-

U.S.

-,

95 S. Ct. 2362

(1975).
169. Id. at 139.
* As this article is going to press, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, see note 72.1 supra,vacating and remanding the decision

of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed supra at note 168. Justice Stewart wrote
for four members of the Court; Justices Marshall, Burger, Rehnquist and Blackmun
concurred; Justice Powell did not participate. Since Albemarle contributes significantly

to the authority on the question of employment testing, at least some preliminary
thoughts on its impact seem appropriate.

To begin with, the Court reaffirmed its Griggscommittment to the EEOC Guidelines.
95 S. Ct. at 2375; see text accompanying note 135 supra. Although it is not clear whether
in so doing the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach in GeorgiaPower which refused
to read Griggs "as requiring compliance by every employer with each technical form of

validation set out in" the Guidelines, see text accompanying note 167 supra, the concurrence of Justice Blackmun so characterized the majority's approach:
I cannot join, however, in the Court's apparent view that absolute compliance

with the EEOC Guidelines is a sine qua non of pre-employment test validation.
95 S. Ct. at 2389; see also the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger, id. at 2387.
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Seniority Systems

The broad scope of title VII's prohibition of unlawful employment practices is restricted by the exemption of certain promotion and compensation systems:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work
in different locations, provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
"I

The South Carolina Human Affairs Law provides for such exceptions to its prohibitions in almost identical language.' 71 The ex-

emption in the South Carolina law, however, will have little
practical significance, at least with respect to public employment, because seniority systems are far less common in government employment than in private industry, especially if, as has
been held,17 1 the Human Affairs Law does not reach municipalities where formal seniority systems are sometimes found. Accordingly, no discussion of the complex problems involved in assessing
seniority systems and rectifying illegalities1 3 will be undertaken
Secondly, the Court noted that the defendant-company's attempted validation of its
testing procedure was "materially defective in several respects." Id. at 2378. These included: (1) overall failure of the tests for lines of progression and for distinct job groupings
within particular lines without a showing of "no significant difference" between the jobs
studied and those not studied as required by the Guidelines; (2) the test scores were
correlated with job preference by means of subjective supervisor's ratings on the basis of
ill-defined criteria, see notes 152-54 and accompanying text supra; (3) the Court endorsed
the Guidelines requirement that testing for high-level jobs would be valid for entry-level
positions only if advancement to such positions is the norm and thus questioned the
company's validation insofar as it found correlation on the basis of high-level position;
and, perhaps most importantly (4) approved the notions of differential-validation and
faulted the company for having failed to so validate when it was technically feasible, see
text accompanying notes 160-64 supra.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1974). The only guideline concerning seniority issued by
the EEOC deals with sex segregation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (1972).
171. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.28(c)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
172. See note 2 supra.
173. For a fuller consideration of these problems see Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. Ray. 1260 (1967); Cooper & Sobol,
Seniority and Testing Under FairEmployment Laws: A GeneralApproach to Objective
Criteriaof Hiring and Promotion,82 HARv. L. Rav. 1598 (1969); Blumrosen, Seniority and
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beyond noting that the courts have generally construed the seniority exception very narrowly. 74'
C. Other Title VII Developments Relevant to Interpreting the
Human Affairs Law
Several other developments under title VII offer sufficient
assistanace in the interpretation of important issues under the
Human Affairs Law to warrant consideration here.
1. Pregnancy as a Temporary Employment Disability
Because only women get pregnant, questions have arisen
concerning the right of an employer to deal differently with pregnant employees than with other employees with respect to leaves
of absence and disability benefits. The EEOC issued Guidelines
interpreting title VII to require employers to treat employment
disabilities relating to pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion and
childbirth as they do all other temporary disabilities for purposes
of leaves of absence, sick leave plans, and health or disability
insurance policies.' Further, the Guidelines also bar employment benefits which provide "insufficient" leave if the policy has
a disproportionate impact on employees of one sex.' Since a "no
Equal Employment Opportunity:A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RuT. L. REV. 268 (1969); Gardner, Development of the Substantive Principles of Title VII Law: The Defendant's View,
26 ALA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1973).
174. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Local 189, United
Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). But see Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester
Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
175. The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, last amended to be effective on April
5, 1972, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1972), provide:
Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from
employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie
violation of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom should be treated as such under any health
or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with
employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability
of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or
sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to
other temporary disabilities.
176. Id. Paragraph (c) provides:
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leave for anyone" policy may have a greater impact on females,
who become pregnant, than on males, the EEOC may have, in
effect, mandated maternity leave in many employment situations.
Whether the federal Guidelines may be said to have been
incorporated into the Human Affairs Law, thus establishing them
as the governing state standard, is, however, uncertain. In order
to appreciate the difficulties, an understanding of the relevant
legal environment is necessary. To begin with, for federal law
purposes EEOC Guidelines are effective under title VII only to
the extent that the courts accept them as consistent with, or
declarative of, Congressional intent, as the Supreme Court in
Griggs accepted the Testing Guidelines. 7 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission simply does not have the power
to establish rules of substantive law.
At one time this would have posed no serious problem. After
all, both Griggs and Phillipsv. MartinMarietta Corp.7 had been
decided prior to the drafting of the Human Affairs Law; viewed
together, the disproportionate impact notion of Griggs and the
rejection of "sex plus" in Martin MariettaCorp. lead logically to
the very position taken by the EEOC in its Guidelines. Accordingly, since the state statute incorporates title VII and its decisional law, the effect is the same as an adoption of the Guidelines
when the latter are viewed as merely declarative of the law itself.
Two problems, however, remain. The first is the effect of the
recent Supreme Court decision in Geduldig v. Aiello 179 on this
analysis. This, in turn, involves two questions: first, the effect of
Geduldig on title VII law; and, secondly, assuming some effect,
the implications for the Human Affairs Law. The first issue has
already been considered in some detail, concluding with the argument that Geduldig should be read as purely an equal protection
case without effects on the federal statutory law of discrimination."'0 Should this position not prevail, however, the second question must be confronted. Assuming that Geduldig does not view
Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by
an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a
termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one
sex and is not justified by business necessity.
177. See note 45 supra.
178. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
179. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
180. See discussion at notes 112-15 supra.
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pregnancy-based discrimination as sex discrimination per se
under title VII, how should this development affect our interpretation of the state statute?
The answer seems to be that it should have no effect at all.
At the time the drafters of the Human Affairs Law adopted the
basic anti-discrimination provisions of title VII, Geduldig was not
the law. Clearly, the General Assembly should be viewed as having intended to adopt the law as it was, complete with the cases
then interpreting it, not as it might be altered by future decisions
sharply changing its directions. Indeed, construing the legislature's intent to incorporate title VII law, however it may be interpreted in the future by the federal courts, raises serious problems
of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."'
Even if this analysis is accepted, however, a second obstacle
remains to concluding that the Human Affairs Law in effect
adopts the position on pregnancy-related discriminations taken
by the EEOC Guidelines, i.e., the possible conflict with other
state laws. Immediately after the passage of the Human Affairs
Law, there seemed to be a problem, since several days previously
the General Assembly had enacted a statute relating to maternity
leave for state employees'82 which may have been inconsistent
with the EEOC Guidelines. Fortunately, however, this potential
area of conflict was obviated by a 1974 amendment which repealed the leave law.' This enactment provided permanent fulltime state employees with 15 days of paid sick leave per year
which may be accumulated for a total of 90 days. It also authorized the State Budget and Control Board to issue rules and regulations to administer the provisions of this law; under this power
the Board has established rules which seem to be in substantial
compliance with the EEOC Guidelines."'
181. Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922) (dictum).

182. An Act to Authorize Maternity Leave for State Employees, No. 1367, [1972]
S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2540. The Human Affairs Law was enacted June 23, 1972. While the
Guidelines require all pregnancy and childbirth-related events to be treated identically
to other temporary job disabilities, the maternity leave law may have treated them differently. It failed to provide for use of sick leave for maternity purposes and, while it granted
unpaid maternity leave, it did not provide for similar unpaid leave for other temporary
disabilities.
183. Act No. 1111, [1974] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2364.
184. The Board's Guidelines provide for the use of paid sick leave for pregnancyrelated purposes, § 1-8(B)(4), and for leave without pay for "any extended illness, disability or maternity leave exceeding the amount of accrued annual and sick leave." § 1-10.
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Want Ads Expressing a Gender Preference

Section 704(b) of title VII makes it an unlawful employment
practice for one covered by the act to publish help wanted ads or
notices that indicate a limitation or preference based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 5 The Human Affairs Law
contains a similarly worded provision.'86 The main problem in
this area in recent years has been sex-segregated job advertising.
While employers, labor unions and employment agencies covered
by title VII are vulnerable for advertising jobs expressing a sex
restriction or preference, the practice survives because newspapers, in merely providing separate male and female job columns,
have been held not to be covered by title VII. Plaintiffs have been
forced to sue individual advertisers rather than the newspaper;
such a seriatim approach is slow, and its cumbersome nature is
aggravated by the fact that a successful plaintiff can rarely expect
damages since the causal connection between the discriminatory
want ad and a loss of earnings is difficult to prove. After all, if
the plaintiff has brought suit, she has found the want ad. Actual
damages, therefore, are likely to flow only from a subsequent
failure to hire on grounds of sex, not from the ad.
In Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co.,"' the
plaintiff, a woman seeking employment, sought a declaratory
judgment against the publisher of three local newspapers for publishing help wanted listings under separate "Men" and "Women"
headings. The court dismissed the case, holding that newspapers
are not employment agencies covered by title VII. It relied for its
decision on both the ordinary meaning of the statute's wording
and gleanings from legislative history. It is possible, however,
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(3)(b) (1974). This is subject to the exception that: "such a
notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification for employment."
186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.28(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974) makes it an unfair practice:
To publish or cause to be published any notice or advertisement relating to
employment by such agency or department indicating any limitation, specification or discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, age or national origin,
except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a limitation, specification or discrimination based on sex or national origin when sex or national origin
is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment. ...
The main substantive difference between the state and federal statutes is that the former
excludes religion as a possible bona fide occupational qualification.
187. 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). See also Greenfield v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 4 E.P.D.
7763 (N.D. hil. 1972).
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that a newspaper might be considered an employment agency if
it actively undertakes to classify job advertisements by sex. That
question is presently being litigated in Morrow v. Mississippi
Publishers Corp."' Thus far, the court has denied the defendant
newspaper's motion to dismiss and has ordered a trial on the
merits to determine whether the newspaper was actively involved
in determining sexual preferences for jobs advertised in the
paper.
Another approach to the problem, perhaps more relevant to
our purposes, is to bring an action against a newspaper for segregated job advertising under an aider-abettor theory. While title
VTI does not include a prohibition against those who aid and abet
violators, the South Carolina law declares in Section 360.28(b):
It shall be an unfair discriminatory practice for any person
(1) To aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any
act declared to be an unfair discriminatory practice by § 1360.28(a) or to attempt to do so. .... 181
In the job advertisement situation, a newspaper which accepts an
ad from a governmental agency or its agent expressing an unjustified sex preference may therefore be in jeopardy as an aider and
abettor."' Although there is no South Carolina law on point, such
a result was reached in PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations."' The city of Pittsburgh had included in its Human Relations Ordinance a provision against
aiders and abettors who "incite, compel, coerce or participate in
the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment
practice." The commonwealth court held that the publisher vio188. 5 E.P.D. 8415 (S.D. Miss. 1974).
189. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.28(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
190. Presumably, the Human Affairs Commission could proceed against an aider and
abettor under S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.29, culminating in an order of relief under §
360.29(d)(14). See generally Sullivan & Zimmer at 12-18. How such an order may be
enforced against a private defendant, however, is not clear. Mandamus would plainly be
inappropriate, so the approaches to enforcing Commission orders against public agencies
suggested in the first installment of this article, Sullivan & Zimmer at 38-61, are inapplicable. This would seem to leave only the alternative of the implication of a private right of
action. Sullivan & Zimmer at 61-79.
191. 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972), aff'd, 413 U.S. 376, rehearingdenied,
414 U.S. 881 (1973). See also, Evening Sentinel v. N.O.W., 9 E.P.D. 10,027 (Conn. Sup.
Ct. 1975); Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 849 (1973); N.O.W. v. State
Division of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d 867 (1974). See Note, Elimination
of Sexually Segregated Employment Ads: A Step Toward Equal Opportunity,26 FL'. L.
REV. 577 (1974).
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lated the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment
by printing job advertisements under sex segregated column
headings because such publication aided employers in engaging
in unlawful sex discrimination. 92'
3.

National Origin Discrimination

Both title VII and the Human Affairs Law prohibit national
origin discrimination and the state law includes ancestry in the
definition of national origin. ' As we have seen,"9 the main issue
under title VII has been whether the prohibition against national
origin discrimination bars discrimination on the basis of alienage.
The Supreme Court, in Espinoza v. FarahManufacturing Co.,'
held that refusal to hire a person because she was not a United
States citizen was not per se national origin discrimination within
the federal statute. Since Espinoza was not decided by the Supreme Court until after the Human Affairs Law was enacted, it
is not controlling on the meaning of the South Carolina law. 96'
Nevertheless, it is at least persuasive authority. Thus, the question becomes, first, whether Espinoza means that discrimination
on the basis of alienage is never prohibited as national origin
discrimination, and, secondly, whether such an interpretation is
appropriate with respect to the South Carolina statute. As to the
former question, the decision poses no problems in construing the
state law if, as has been suggested, Espinoza can be read simply
as a straightforward application of Griggs with the initial prima
192. The case was affirmed by the Supreme Court, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), in an opinion
upholding the statute, as interpreted by the state court, to impose liability on the newspaper, against a constitutional challenge on first amendment grounds.
193. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.23(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974). See Sullivan & Zimmer at 4
n.6.
194. See text accompanying notes 53-55 and 99-101 supra.
195. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
196. One difficulty with this argument is the fact that the Supreme Court's decision
in Espinoza was an affirmance of the Fifth Circuit's determination, 462 F.2d 1331 (1972),
which had, in turn, reversed the district court, 343 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D. Tex. 1971). The
circuit court's decision was handed down on May 31, 1972, prior to the enactment of the
Human Affairs Law on June 23, 1972, but subsequent to the drafting of that statute. The
question, then, is whether the General Assembly, when it passed the Law, should be taken
to have intended to incorporate the title VII national origin discrimination provision as it
had then been interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, or whether it is more appropriate to
discount that precedent. In view of the slowness of official reports and the short time
period between the Fifth Circuit's decision and the passage of the law, it is doubtful if
the General Assembly should be viewed as having enacted the law as it was there
interpreted. It is true, however, that the case was reported in the CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE
on June 8, 1972.
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facie case rebutted by statistics showing no disproportionate impact.
Espinoza may mean, however, that citizenship discrimination will not constitute national origin discrimination even when
it has the unintended (in an evil-motive sense) effect of discriminating on national origin grounds. If this position is correct, then
Espinoza marks an abrupt and questionable break with prior title
VII law. It is doubtful whether such a change in direction should
be incorporated into the state law. For one reason, the Court's
rationale in Espinoza looked to Congressional intent and found
that a title VII prohibition of citizenship discrimination would be
inconsistent with federal statutes mandating such discrimination
in federal employment. There is no reason to believe that such an
inference is appropriate in South Carolina. Indeed, the General
Assembly recently repealed a statute barring aliens from government employment,'97 thus, perhaps inferentially, establishing a
state policy opposing discrimination on the basis of alienage.
There is, however, another compelling reason to interpret the
Human Affairs Law as a bar to citizenship discrimination, at
least where it has the purpose or effect of national origin discrimination (which will usually be the case). Two cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the term previous to Espinoza held, respectively, that a state cannot maintain a general prohibition against
197. A provision of S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-35 (1962) provided that: "No public funds of
this State or any of its subdivisions. . . shall be available. . . to any person other than

a qualified American citizen as compensation for employment." The section was
repealed in No. 1457, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2475.
One other statute discriminates against aliens in government employment, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 66-705, which establishes United States citizenship as a qualification for members
of the State Board of Engineering Examiners. See also, S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-665, which
establishes United States citizenship as a condition for a license as a funeral director and
an embalmer, respectively, and § 1-33, which limits blind persons operating concession
stands in government buildings to United States citizens. Any such provision, with regard
to either government employment or the licensing of private occupations, is of doubtful
constitutionality, see text accompanying notes 198-201 infra. The provision requiring citizenship for members of the Board of Engineering Examiners survived, however, on a
statutory level at least, both the repeal of the general bar on government employment of
aliens and the enactment of the Human Affairs Law, since a subsequent amendment to §
56-705 in 1973 repeated the qualificiation with respect to a newly added land surveyor
member of the Board. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-705 (Cum. Supp. 1974).

South Carolina also has a number of statutory provisions discriminating against nonresidents, in addition to the now-famous constitutional requirement relating to the Governor. Dekle v. Ravenel (S.C. Sup. Ct. September 23, 1974). Since these provisions act to
bar United States citizens who are not residents of South Carolina as well as aliens, it is
unlikely that there will be a disproportionate impact on national origin grounds.
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hiring aliens for public appointments,'98 and that a state cannot
exclude all noncitizens from admission to the bar."' The former
decision, Sugarman v. Dougall, involved an equal protection
challenge to New York's proscription against the hiring of noncitizens for certain state jobs. The Court, with the single dissent of
Justice Rehnquist, held alienage a situation calling for "new
equal protection analysis involving suspect classification" which
required the state to carry the heavy burden of showing compelling state interest to justify the classification."' Under close judicial scrutiny, the prohibition against hiring noncitizens was held
not to be justified.
Since alienage discrimination appears to be generally invalid
under an equal protection analysis, and since it is not unreasonable to interpret the Human Affairs Law as barring citizenship
bias where it has the effect of national origin discrimination, it
seems appropriate for the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission and the state courts to reach such a result in interpreting
the state law with respect to government employment."'
4.

Age Discrimination

Perhaps the most startling aspect of the Human Affairs Law
is its unqualified prohibition of discrimination on account of
age.20 2 No such provision is included in title VII. Separate federal
legislation, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,203
does prohibit age discrimination; however, its coverage is limited
to individuals who are at least 40 years of age and not older than
65.2o4 Thus, the state statute goes beyond the federal law by protecting against discrimination because of youth as well as old age.
This difference in scope reveals a substantial difference in theory
between the two laws. The federal statute creates a protected
class for the purposes of employment decisions consisting of those
198. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
199. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
200. See generally Note, Developments in the Law- Equal Protection,82 HARv. L.
REv. 1065 (1969).
201. Interestingly enough, a recent decision by the Fifth Circuit, Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974), avoided the impact of Espinoza even
with respect to private employment by finding that alienage discrimination violated the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, as it has been broadened in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), even though
it did not violate title VII.
202. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.28(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
203. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-259 (1974).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1967).
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who are 40 years of age or over but who have not yet reached age
65. Two examples show how this protected class analysis works.
First, suppose an employer advertises for employment openings
for persons between "age 25 to 35"; the ad is illegal since everyone
over age 40 would be excluded along with those under 25 and
those between 36 and 40.205 Secondly, consider an employer who
hires only recipients of Social Security benefits. Under a Griggs
analysis, the policy will have differential impact on those under
age 62 - the earliest age for retirement benefits - and so would,
prima facie, be age discrimination against those 40 to 62.211
The state law, however, does not create a protected class.
Thus, on its face, the state law would protect a person of any age
from having employment decisions made because she or he was
"too old" or "too young." Hence, age would be removed as the
basis for making any kind of employment decision. Individualized determinations would have to replace flat rules predicated
on age.2" 7
The more significant issue for government employment is the
impact of the Human Affairs Law on mandatory retirement ages.
Although no general state law establishes a minimum age for
government employment,2"' one enactment does set the state re205. Interpretations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by Wage and
Hour Division, Department of Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 860.92 (1974).
206. Id. at § 860.104.
207. Cf. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), which held
that where human safety is at issue and statistical data suggest that certain older employees will be less safe than others, a prohibition of new employees over a certain age will be
a bona fide occupational qualification under the federal statute. While there is no BFOQ
for age in the Human Affairs Law, the same result may be attainable by use of the jobrelatedness notion. See Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
Such a rule, however, if appropriate at all, should be carefully limited to avoid heavy
inroads into the general governing principle that employment decisions ought to be made
on the basis of individual qualifications, not membership in a particular class.
208. There are a number of state statutes indirectly establishing minimum age qualifications for certain government employment. For example, statutory provisions require
applicants for a license to practice certain professions or trades to be a certain age. For
example, S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-51 sets the minimum age for architects at 25, and § 56-462
requires apprentice cosmetologists to be 16 years old. Furthermore, the statutes often
establish governing boards, membership on which constitutes governmental employment,
and such membership is limited in whole or in part to licensed individuals. See, e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-4. The effect is to import a minimum age qualification into government
employment. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-33, which limits blind persons operating sales
stands in government buildings to those over 21 years of age.
Whether any such age limitations on government employment should be held to have
been repealed by the Human Affairs Law is an open question. On the one hand, the Law
is absolute in its prohibition of age discrimination, and it is often said that where two
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tirement age at 70 years, subject to limited exceptions. 9 Unfortunately, there is no way to give both the retirement law and the
Human Affairs Law full effect." ' The question becomes, therefore, which statute should be found controlling.
General principles of statutory construction provide little
assistance in resolving this difficulty since they point in different
directions. On the one hand, the retirement statute predates the
Human Affairs Law, so it would be possible to invoke the principle that the latter enactment prevails over an earlier one. 2 '1 On
the other hand, the Human Affairs Law does not explicitly repeal
the retirement statute and repeals by implication are not viewed
favorably. 212 Further, it is an accepted canon of statutory construction that, in the event of a conflict, the more specific may
control the more general, even if the more specific statute was
statutes conflict, the latter prevails. See generally 2A Su'rHERLAND, supra note 22 at §
51.05. On the other hand, it is sometimes held that conflicts between statutes should be
resolved by the more specific, even if prior in time, controlling the more general. Criterion
Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 258 S.C. 282, 188 S.E.2d 459 (1972); 2A Sutherland, supra note 22
at § 51.05; Culbreth v. Prudence Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 46, 127 S.E.2d 132 (1962). No
detailed consideration of this question is warranted, however, since it seems.unlikely that
age qualifications, as such, will bar individuals from government employment; almost
every person having the other requisite qualifications will satisfy the age standard.
209. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-103 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides:
Retirement at seventy-Any employee in service who has attained the age of
seventy years shall be retired forthwith, except that: (1) with the approval of
his employer he may remain in service until the end of the year following the
date on which he attains the age of seventy years;
(2) With the approval of his employer and the Board he may, upon his request
therefor, be continued in service for a period of one year following each such
request until such employee has reached the age of seventy-two years; and
(3) With the approval of his employer, upon his request therefor, be continued
in service for such period of time as may be necessary for such employee to
qualify for coverage under the old age and survivors insurance provision of title
II of the Federal Social Security Act, as amended.
It shall be mandatory for any employee or teacher whether or not appointed and
regardless of whether or not a member of the South Carolina Retirement System
to retire no later than the end of the fiscal year in which he reaches his seventysecond birthday.
210. Cf. McIlvanie v. Pennsylvania State Police, 6 Pa. Cmwlth. 505, 296 A.2d 630
(1972), aff'd, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973). There, the commonwealth court found no
conflict between a mandatory retirement age statute and the state Human Relations Act,
reasoning that the Human Relations Act bars age discrimination only if age is not a BFOQ
and only if the mandatory retirement statute establishes age as a BFOQ. The dissent of
Justice Roberts of the supreme court, 309 A.2d at 804-11, takes issue with the lower court's
view of BFOQ. The dispute, however, is not relevant to our situation since age is not
within the BFOQ escape clause in the South Carolina Human Affairs Law.
211. See generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 22, at §§ 51.02-.03.
212. Id. at § 23.09-.10.
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enacted first.213 Finally, in the area of mandatory retirement ages,
there are no consitutional reasons for preferring that one statute
14
prevail over the other."
If no accepted principles compel a conclusion either way, the
question appears open to resolution on pure policy grounds:
should the Human Affairs Law be held to repeal the state's mandatory retirement statute? Without attempting to definitively
resolve a complex issue, there are good reasons to prefer an affirmative answer. The chief virtues of mandatory retirement ages
are basically twofold: first, the administrative convenience of
avoiding individual determinations of continued competence;
secondly, opening opportunities to younger employees. The main
vice is that such provisions bar from gainful employment numerous individuals without regard to whether they are competent to
continue working, thereby depriving them of a means of support,
and the state of perhaps exceptionally qualified services. The
financial hardships for the affected individuals are likely to be
especially severe in the present time of rising inflation. A balancing of these considerations seems to favor the older employee's
right to continue working during competence. "Administrative
convenience" is rarely a compelling interest, 1 5 and this ought to
be especially true with respect to mandatory retirement. First,
many, perhaps most, older employees will choose optional retirement, thus restricting the number of individual determinations
which must be made; and, secondly, the issue to be determined
in each case is relatively clear-cut: is the employee competent to
continue work? Indeed, the popularity of mandatory retirement
provisions may in large part be due not to the difficulty of making
judgments on competence but rather to a bureaucratic desire to
avoid embarassing situations. It is, after all, easier to tell an
employee that he is being dismissed because he is 65 than to
inform him that he is "over the hill." While avoiding embarassment for decision-makers may be a legitimate concern, it is not
213. Id. at § 51.05. See Smith v. State Highway Dept., 138 S.C. 374, 136 S.E. 487

(1927).
214. This is not to say that the state's mandatory retirement age is necessarily constitutional under the equal protection clause, although the recent Supreme Court dismissal
for want of a substantial federal question, 415 U.S. 986 (1974), of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision in McIlvanie, cited at note 210 supra, has been read by some
courts as foreclosing the issue of equal protection challenges to mandatory retirement ages.
See also Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 420
U.S. 940 (1975).
215. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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a substantial one and hardly outweighs the hardships a flat retirement rule may impose on many individuals.
The second justification for mandatory retirement ages, a
desire to open opportunities for younger individuals in government employment, is no more cogent. To begin with, it is not
clear why one group (the young) should be preferred to another
(the old). Further, the abolition of a mandatory retirement age
would not necessarily freeze older employees into jobs at the expense of bright younger persons. "Competence," after all, is essentially a relative concept, and employees could, on an
individual basis, be compelled to retire if it was reasonable to
believe they would not perform as well as their younger colleagues.
V.

THE HUMAN AFFAIRS COMMISSION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

PLANS
Although the law of employment discrimination has, for the
most part, evolved through litigation, the differential impact
model of discrimination requires the adoption of a structural
perspective which more readily lends itself to administrative
regulation of employment practices - an approach potentially
more efficient and effective than the case-by-case resolution of
disputes. On the federal level, efforts at administrative control
have taken the form of "affirmative action" plans,"6 which are
generally required of federal government contractors or suppliers
as a condition of dealing with the government.2 1 7 These plans
216. See generally Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46
N.Y.U.L. REv. 225 (1971); Leiken, PreferentialTreatment in the Skilled Building Trades:
An Analysis of the PhiladelphiaPlan, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 84 (1970); Comment, The
PhiladelphiaPlan:A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 723
(1972). There has also been considerable scholarly concern with an analagous problem,
the use of numerical goals as remedial devices for violations of the constitution or title
VII. See generally Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 341
(1970); Comment, The HiringPreferenceOrderas a Remedy for Employment Discrimination: Does Carterv. GallagherLimit the Use of Absolute PreferenceOrders?, 14 B.C. IND.
& COMM. L. REv. 297 (1972); Note, Constitutionalityof Remedial MinorityPreferences in
Employment, 56 MINN. L. REV. 842 (1972).
217. The most prominent source of affirmative action plans has been Executive Order
11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974), signed September 24, 1965, and effective October 24, 1965.
Executive Order 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967), signed October 13, 1967, effective in
part on November 12, 1967, and in part on October 14, 1968, amended Executive Order
11246 by substituting the word "religion" for "creed" as a prohibited basis of discrimination and by adding "sex" to the types of discrimination prohibited. The contents of
affirmative action plans are specified in more detail by the so-called "Revised Order 4,
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require employers to analyze their employment systems and establish goals and timetables to correct any areas in which protected classes of employees are under-utilized.
The first step, a utilization analysis, in effect requires the
employer to determine whether there exists a prima facie case
against it under the Griggs differential impact approach. 28 If such
a case is found, the employer must then develop a plan to remedy
the discrimination, establishing percentage employment goals for
members of protected classes and timetables for reaching those
goals. It is this remedial process that makes affirmative action
most susceptible to attack, especially under the argument that
such plans constitute government-mandated "reverse discrimination." The reverse discrimination objection misconceives the
meaning of properly drawn affirmative action plans. The remedial concept does not mandate the hiring of incompetent employees; rather, the goals and timetables should be established to
reflect the availability of qualified women and minorities. In effect, the establishment of these targets parallels the second stage
of the Griggs analysis - business necessity. The employer should
review his selection criteria to determine which of those with
disproportionate impact can be justified. After having eliminated
any illegitimate requirements, the employer should determine
the percentage of women and minorities available in the area
employment market who satisfy the remaining job-related criteria and establish his goals to reflect that percentage in his work
forces as vacancies become available. These goals must, of course,
be projected over time to include such variables as increased
numbers of entry-level qualified minority workers resulting from
special training programs and progressively greater numbers of
minority candidates qualified for more important positions because of increased representation at the entry level.
In theory, then, affirmative action does not mandate reverse
discrimination, in the sense of preferring unqualified minorities
and women over white males. Rather, it simply seeks to create the
kind of balanced work force which is reasonably expected when
employees are recruited, hired and promoted on the basis of legitAffirmative Action Programs of Government Nonconstruction Contractors," 41 C.F.R. §§
60-2.1 et seq. (1974). Similar requirements are also imposed on construction contractors,
33 Fed. Reg. 10715 (1968), and affirmative programs are required for federal employment
by Executive Order 11478, signed August 8, 1969, 3 C.F.R. § 133 (1969).
218. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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imate job requirements. Even this might, perhaps, be criticized
as discriminatory but for the fact that rigid compliance with the
goals and timetables is not required; only a good faith effort is
mandated, a standard which presumably is satisfied by the establishment of legitimate selection and promotion criteria." Further, the interests of presently employed workers are not infringed
by affirmative action since such plans are directed only at filling
vacancies and new positions.
It is true, of course, that the functional effects of affirmative
action may sometimes differ from this theoretic construct. If goals
and timetables are set higher than the available protected class
populace (as assessed under legitimate criteria of competence),
there will be a tendency to hire unqualified persons. Even though
the "good faith" requirement offers a safety valve for such pressure, some employers may prefer to take an unqualified person
rather than subject their good faith to administrative scrutiny.
Nevertheless, these practical problems are only potential trouble
spots to be guarded against, not valid criticisms of the whole
affirmative action concept.
Although an affirmative action requirement is not explicitly
set forth in the South Carolina Human Affairs Law, the Human
Affairs Commission seems to contemplate that state agencies will
develop affirmative action plans. Rather than explicitly mandating such plans, however, the Commission has attempted, in more
subtle ways, to persuade state agencies to implement plans. Its
main effort has been the publication of "Think Affirmative,"22' a
booklet stressing affirmative action in three ways. First, using the
"jaw-boning" technique, it sets forth a letter from Governor West
commending the use of affirmative action plans as a sound approach to end the inequities that have become imbedded in em2 1
ployment systems.1
Secondly, by rather clear reference to federal intervention through Griggs-style federal lawsuits, the Com219. Affirmative action to some extent parallels the title VII provision authorizing the
court to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1974). The critical difference is that relief in a title VII case comes only after a determination that the defendant has engaged in illegal discrimination; no such finding is necessary
to impose the affirmative action obligation on government contractors. The most famous
case of court imposition of an affirmative action plan in a title VII case, however, is the
consent settlement entered by the EEOC, the Department of Labor, and American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAcmcS GUIDE
1860-61 (1974).
220. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HUMAN AFFAIRS COMMISSION, THINK AFsIrATIvE (1973)
[hereinafter cited as THINK AFFIRMATIVE].
221. Id. at i.
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mission implicitly suggests that the state agencies clean up their
own houses lest an outside authority do it for them. Finally, the
Commission, by listing the enforcement powers it possesses, suggests that it may have the statutory authority to impose affirmative action plans.2 22 In addition, the Commission has moved in the
direction of affirmative action by promulgating rules requiring
each state agency to submit an "Equal Employment Opportunity
Report"; to designate and submit the name of an "Equal Employment Officer" who is responsible for such reports; to retain
all employment applications for two years; and to post antidiscrimination notices.221 Taken together, the booklet and these
rules seem to commit the Commission to the affirmative action
24
approach to discrimination in state employment.
These efforts appear to have been reasonably effective. By
November 9, 1973, slightly more than one year after the Commission's creation, all 83 state agencies with ten or more employees
had at least submitted to the Commission first drafts of their
affirmative action plans. 225 Nevertheless, submission and imple222. Id. at 3-6.
223. [1972-73] SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HuIhtAN AFFAIRS COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT

at 99-100 [hereinafter cited as 1972-73 ANNUAL REPORT].
224. The Human Affairs Commission may go somewhat beyond affirmative action as
it has usually been implemented at the federal level insofar as it apparently envisions the
use of affirmative assistance to enable members of protected classes to become qualified:
In the absence of a resource of fully qualified minorities and females to fill all
job categories employed by the state, the agencies must either provide training
directly, or make available outside training, to qualify minority and female
persons to fill middle and upper level positions, and, thus achieve affirmative
action goals.
1972-73 ANNUAL REPORT at 12. If this report envisions training opportunities limited to
females and minorities the question of reverse discrimination arises. See text accompanying notes 264-95 infra.
A similar problem arises with respect to the language of THINK AFFIRMATIVE:
The ultimategoal of affirmative action should be the absence of any disparities
in the work force at alljob levels, and the absence of any form of discrimination.
A target date should be established for the attainment of this condition. The
achievement of this ultimate goal will necessarily necessitate [sic] many intermediate or short-range goals in such areas as hiring, promotion, recruiting,
training and selection.
THINK AFFIRMATIVE at 8 (emphasis in original). If this language implies that proportionate
representation is required without regard to qualifications, it poses serious problems.
Perhaps it is better read as an affirmation of the belief that minorities and women, with
the training the Commission envisions for them, will become qualified on proportionately
equal terms with white males. This interpretation seems most likely in view of the statement, in reference to goals, that "[i]deally the workforce at all levels reflects the available
manpower [sic] in terms of race and sex." THINK AFFIRmATIVE at 8.
225. 1972-73 ANNUAL REPORT at 3.
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mentation of plans are entirely different propositions. To the extent that the agencies do not voluntarily comply, the question
remains whether the Commission may require government employers within its jurisdiction to develop affirmative action plans
and then compel them to enforce any such plans submitted. 2 6
That question, in turn, raises two sets of problems. The first
concerns the authority under state law to impose affirmative action plans, a matter which necessitates an inquiry focusing both
on the power of the Governor to act without specific legislation
and the authority of the Commission to require affirmative action
plans under the Human Affairs Law. The second problem involves the constitutionality of such plans if authorized.
A.

MandatingAffirmative Action Plans Under State Law

1.

By Executive Order

The first problem concerns the legal status of affirmative
action plans in terms of gubernatorial powers, and this must be
examined from two aspects. First, the action taken by the Governor to date must be clearly determined. Second, the legal consequences of those actions must be analyzed.
The only express action taken thus far by a South Carolina
governor with respect to affirmative action plans for state agencies has been a letter by Governor West published by the Human
2
Affairs Commission: 2
The Constitutional Fathers of this Nation and this State asserted the principle of equal opportunity as a matter of moral
and legal concern. Conditions and practices which result in less
than equal opportunity are matters of moral and legal concern
for us today.
It is well-known that human beings, both by design and
default, have allowed inequities to become imbedded in the
systems of government and private enterprise. An admission of
that truth can be the first step in recovering the ideals which
are our heritage.
In South Carolina the historic commitment of the State to
the principle of equal opportunity is to be constantly reaffirmed
226. If the Commission is found to have authority to impose affirmative action plans
and their implementation on state agencies, enforcement would be executed by mandamus. Such a procedure is analogous to our discussion of actions taken either by the
Commission, Sullivan & Zimmer at 41-53, or by the Attorney General, Id. at 53-61.
227. TuNK AFFMATIvE.
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by the action of its agencies, departments and local subdivisions. This commitment can be made with the confidence that
South Carolinians are dedicated to the ideas of justice and equity.
Affirmative action as presented in this guidebook, represents a sound approach to the fulfillment of this office's commitment to equal opportunity for all our citizens. I commend its use
to all employers in this State.28
The impact of this document is far from clear. Although it neither
explicitly mentions affirmative action plans nor orders state
agencies to adopt them, the letter was plainly written to serve as
a preface to "Think Affirmative." Its general outline traces the
requirements of an affirmative action plan: a description of equal
opportunity as a legal concern followed by a statement that systemic discrimination has occurred and that affirmative action,
"as presented in this guidebook," is a "sound approach" to fulfilling the Governor's commitment to equal opportunity. Although
a more explicit pronouncement would be preferable, it is not hard
to view the Governor's letter, in the context in which it appears,
as constituting a proclamation requiring state agencies to implement affirmative action plans. Such an informal mandate would
2
not be unprecedented. 1
Assuming acceptance of the above analysis, a second question arises: is such a declaration within the authority of the Governor? The South Carolina Constitution provides that:
The supreme executive authority of this State shall be vested
in a Chief Magistrate, who shall be styled "The Governor of the
State of South Carolina."0
It would appear that such a provision should be read as a complete grant of executive power, subject only to explicit reservations," ' giving the Governor the authority to establish personnel
policies for all executive agencies of the state, including affirmative action plans, provided that such policies do not conflict with
228. Id. at ii.
229. In Pennsylvania, the Governor apparently promulgated a requirement for affirmative action plans in state highway construction by a press release. See 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICEs GUmE
27,297 (1972).
230. S.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
231. See Byrd v. Lawrimore, 212 S.C. 281, 47 S.E.2d 728 (1948), which held that
article III, § 1 vested the General Assembly with all legislative power subject only to
expressed reservations. See also State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E. 625
(1936).
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other constitutional provisions 32 or valid legislative enactments.2ss This inherent power rationale is further buttressed by
two other provisions in the Constitution. First, the Governor is
mandated to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.24
Plainly, affirmative action satisfies the first provision by assisting
in the execution not only of the Human Affairs Law itself, whose
purpose is to "eliminate and prevent discrimination, ' 2 3 but also
of the state's equal protection clause.2 31 Secondly, the
Constitution states that
All State officers, agencies, and institutions within the Executive Branch shall, when required by the Governor, give him
information in writing upon any subject relating to the duties
and functions of their respective offices, agencies, and institutions, including itemized account of receipts and disbursements. 7
That portion of affirmative action requiring plans and compliance reports obviously falls within this provision.
This interpretation of these state constitutional provisions is
also supported in practice, both in the federal government2s and
among South Carolina's sibling states. It has been common for
governors to impose fair employment practice rules applicable to
state employment through the use of executive orders. 5 Many of
232. The most obvious possible conflict is with the state's equal protection clause,
S.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 5 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See text accompanying notes 264-95 infra.
233. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-11 (Cum. Supp. 1974). Section 1-11 might be interpreted
to circumscribe the manner in which executive orders are to be issued. The section requires certain rules and regulations to be filed with the Secretary of State before they
become effective. The provision, however, concerns only "[r]ules and regulations adopted
under authority of a general and permanent law of the State . . . ." Obviously, an
executive order, being issued under the authority of the Constitution, would not fall within
this statute.
234. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
235. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.24(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
236. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5 (Cum. Supp. 1974) This, of course, is true only if affirmative action plans in fact eliminate discrimination, as opposed to mandating unconstitutional "reverse discrimination." See text accompanying notes 264"-95 infra.
237. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-47 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
238. See notes 216-22 supra.
239. See, e.g., California Governor's Code of Fair Practices by State Agencies, issued
July 24, 1963, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIcEs GUIDE 1 20,895 (1972); Connecticut Governor's Code of Fair Practices, Executive Order, Feb. 28, 1967, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIcES GUIDE
21,310 (1974); Delaware Governor's Executive Order No. 9, July 15, 1969, 3
CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIcEs GUIDE 21,500 (1972); Illinois Governor's Code of Fair Practices Governing State Executive Offices, July 10, 1963, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
GUIDE
22,499A (1972); Maryland Governor's Code of Fair Practices, Executive Order,
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these orders require written affirmative action plans by state
agencies,24 and several have placed the responsibility for the
administration and review of such affirmative action plans in
state fair employment practices agencies or other employment
agencies.241

Current litigation challenging such use of executive power
elsewhere has taken two tacts. On the federal level, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in ContractorsAssociation of Eastern
Pennsylvania v. Schultz2 12 rejected a challenge to the authority of
the President to issue Executive Order No. 11,246 insofar as it
applied to government contractors. If anything, control of personnel policies of government agencies would seem to be more "inherent" than imposition of employment requirements on those
who do business with the government. The second focus of attack
has been on local affirmative action requirements on the ground
that such plans conflict with the federal laws and, therefore, are
invalid under the supremacy clause. The courts faced with this
issue have upheld the state plans, finding them in conformity
with the broad purposes of the federal laws and not so conflicting
in operation to render the state schemes invalid.2 3 There is no
reason to believe that any different result should obtain with
respect to affirmative action plans in South Carolina.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that
an exercise of gubernatorial power to require affirmative action
plans of state agencies within the Executive Department is effective absent some conflict with another constitutional provision or
Dec. 9, 1970, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE

23,980 (1972); Massachusetts Governor's Code of Fair Practices, Executive Order No. 74, July 20, 1970, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT
PRACrIcEs GUIDE
24,180 (1972); Missouri Governor's Executive Order, Sept. 10, 1973, 3
CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTIcES GUIDE 24,935 (1974); New Jersey Governor's Code of Fair
Practices, Executive Order No. 21, June 24, 1965, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTIcEs GUIDE
25,720 (1972); Ohio State Affirmative Action Policy, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACrcEs GUIDE
26,710 (1972); Public Employment Non-Discrimination and Affirmative Action issued
Jan. 27, 1972, and Sept. 13, 1973, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 26,715 (1973);
Rhode Island Governor's Executive Order No. 8, June 9, 1969, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE %27,600 (1974); Tennessee Governor's Code of Fair Practices, Executive Order
No. 17, Jan. 14, 1972, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTIcES GUIDE 27,950 (1974).
240. See text accompanying note 239 supra,for orders from Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island (Executive Order No. 32), and Tennessee.
241. See text accompanying note 239 supra, for orders from Massachusetts, Ohio,
Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
242. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
243. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973); City of New
York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Cf. Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
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a valid state or federal enactment. No such conflict is apparent
at the present time. Viewing, as we have, the letter of Governor
West as an exercise of this power, the affirmative action requirement is soundly based.
2. By the Independent Power of the Human Affairs Commission
to Require Affirmative Action Plans
Beyond the inherent executive power of the Governor, the
Human Affairs Law must be considered as a possible source of the
authority of the Human Affairs Commission to require affirmative action plans. While there is no specific authorization for
affirmative action in the statute, 4 4 the Commission does have a
number of powers which, read together, arguably support a Commission requirement of affirmative action plans. Thus, Section 7
of the Human Affairs Law empowers the Commission:
(c) To promulgate, in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter, rules and regulations.
(d) To formulate policies to effectuate the purposes of this
chapter and to make recommendations to appropriate parties in
furtherance of such policies.
(e) To obtain and utilize upon request the services of all governmental departments and agencies.
(i) To require from any State agency or department or its local
subdivisions such reports and information at such times as it
may deem reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of
this chapter.24
Based on similar powers, fair employment practice agencies in a
number of states have issued rules and regulations requiring af244. Unlike the remedy section of title VII, section 706(g), which specifies that a
judicial remedy may include "such affirmative action as may be appropriate," 42 U.S.C.
§ 200Oe-5(g) (1974), the administrative remedy section of the Human Affairs Laws, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1.360.29(14) (Cum. Supp. 1974), only states that the Commission's order may
require
that such unfair discriminatory practice be discontinued and requiring such
other action including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading
of employees, with or without back pay to the persons aggrieved by such practice
as, in the judgment of the panel, will effectuate the purposes of this chapter.
This provision, however, applies only to remedying those practices found in violation of
the statute after a hearing has been held.
245. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.27 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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firmative action plans.2 16
The prime difficulty in South Carolina, however, is that the
Supreme Court has announced a doctrine of strict construction
of agency powers. While the rule has not been applied as rigorously as it has sometimes been articulated,2 7 it does pose a serious obstacle to finding authority in the Human Affairs Commission to impose and enforce affirmative action programs on state
agencies. Nevertheless, there are grounds for contending that the
obstacle can be surmounted. It is clear that at least some elements of affirmative action pose no difficulties since they fall
clearly within one or more of the Commission's express powers.
The Commission could use its policy-making power to promulgate 2 1 the Griggs differential impact definition of discrimination.24 Indeed, this action may not be strictly necessary; since
that view of discrimination is imbedded in the gloss of the statute, such an interpretation would be merely declarative. The reporting requirements250 would, then, justify mandatory submission of the kind of analysis of employment statistics used in both
Griggs and affirmative action analysis to the Commission. Even
the establishment of goals and timetables may fall within the
power to require reports coupled with the power to "obtain and
utilize upon request the services of all governmental departments
'2 51
and agencies.
The real difficulty arises in seeking a source of Commission
authority within the Human Affairs Law to require implementa246. The California state commission, relying on a state statute prohibiting discrimination by state contractors coupled with the commission's general rule-making power,
adopted rules requiring state contractors to submit affirmative action programs. 3 CCH
EMPLOYMENT PRACTIcEs GUIDE
20,875.18-.20 (1973). The Illinois Commission did the
same, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTicEs GUIDE 22,515.01-.10 (1974); the Kansas Commission, based on its general rule-making power, required employers not to forego affirmative
action even where employment tests have been validated, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICEs
GUIDE 23,091.14 (1972), and required affirmative action to recruit women where they had
previously been excluded, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAcTicEs GUIDE 23,093.07 (1972); Michigan adopted Guidelines for Affirmative Action Programs pursuant to its Civil Rights
Commission's rule-making authority, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE
24,203
(1972); and the Ohio Civil Rights Commission promulgated Guidelines on Goals and
Timetables for Affirmative Action Programs, July 23, 1974, 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRcTicas
GUIDE 26,695 (1974).
247. Sullivan & Zimmer, supra note 1, at 41-53.
248. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.27(d) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
249. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See text accompanying notes 2745 supra.Michigan did exactly that. 3 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 24,235 (1972).
250. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.27 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
251. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.27(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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tion of state agency affirmative action plans. Such action goes
beyond mere reporting because it involves changing the operation
of agency employment systems. Arguably, that authority is found
in the power to utilize the services of government agencies. Since
one main purpose of the Human Affairs Law is to remedy discrimination in state agencies, it is reasonable to believe that the
"services" power was created to give the Commission authority
to order other agencies to end discrimination. 5 '
In sum, an argument can be made that the Human Affairs
Law, reasonably interpreted, authorizes the Commission not only
to require affirmative action plans but also to enforce them. Alternatively, as discussed previously, the Commission's power to
do so may be found in the actions of Governor West. Finally, even
if it is decided that the Commission is not empowered to enforce
affirmative action plans as such, the clear power to require reports as part of such plans is still important. After all, the Commission can examine such plans, and success or failure in complying with them, to determine if the Commission's adjudicatory
function should be invoked by filing a complaint against a state
agency for committing an unfair discriminatory practice.ss
252. Assuming that the Human Affairs Law authorizes the Commission's requirement of affirmative action plans, there would seem to be no problem with respect to
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See South Carolina State Highway Dept
v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466 (1955); Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d
621 (1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 521 (1963); and Lee v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins.
Co., 250 S.C. 462, 158 S.E.2d 774 (1968). The Harbin court announced the test of the
constitutionality of delegated powers:
It is well settled that while the legislature may not delegate its power to make
laws, in enacting a law complete in itself, it may authorize an administrative
agency or board "to fill up the details" by prescribing rules and regulations for
the complete operation and enforcement of the law within its expressed general
purpose. [Citations omitted]. "However, it is necessary that the statute declare
a legislative policy, establish primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down
an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform, with a proper regard for the protection of the public interests and with
such degree of certainty as the nature of the case permits, and enjoin a procedure
under which, by appeal or otherwise, both public interests and private rights
shall have due consideration." State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 13 A.2d 586,
594.
86 S.E.2d at 470. Plainly, this test poses no serious problems for a Human Affairs Commission mandate requiring affirmative action plans. The entire Human Affairs Law establishes the ultimate non-discrimination standard. Further, not only is the statute precise
in its prohibitions, but any lack of specificity may be remedied by looking to the judicial
decisions interpreting title VII.
253. The statute plainly contemplates complaints being filed by members of the
Commission. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-360.29(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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Constitutionality of Affirmative Action

If the Human Affairs Commission is deemed authorized to
require state agencies to submit, and comply with, affirmative
action plans, the sole remaining question concerns the constitutional dimensions of such plans under the equal protection clause
of the 14th amendment. 54' This inquiry is a complex one, and the
present discussion will content itself with establishing a framework for analysis of the issues involved and sketching some tentative conclusions.
At the risk of over-simplifying, traditional equal protection
analysis gives deference to legislative choices except in certain
instances involving "suspect" classifications or "fundamental"
rights. When either of these is present, "strict scrutiny" is imposed, and the classification will be invalidated unless it can be
justified by a "compelling state interest." '55 Race is the first and
foremost suspect class.25 Thus, if affirmative action plans are
viewed as creating a racial classification, they may be subjected
to a very heavy burden of justification.
The "strict scrutiny" test suggests the two main lines of our
inquiry. First, does affirmative action constitute racial
classification; and, secondly, if so, can it be justified in terms of
its ameliorative or benign purposes? Affirmative action plans are
almost invariably described as "goals" rather than "quotas" in
order to avoid being characterized as racial classification. Accordingly, the Human Affairs Commission's affirmative action proposals attempt to minimize any equal protection challenge by
describing the employment goals as an internally established,
"numerical, flexible objective which should be diligently sought,
and may even be exceeded, and is subject only to good faith
efforts by the employer."' 7 A goal is to be distinguished from a
quota which is "imposed on the employer by an external source
of authority, normally a court of law. It is a rigid number, usually
based on nothing more than demographic statistics, which must
254. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also, S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 5. Presumably, the
analysis under both equal protection clauses is the same.
255. See generally, Note, Developments in Law Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065 (1969).
256. Id. at 1087-90. The sex discrimination aspect of affirmative action plans may be
subject to a different test than racial classifications. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
177 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974).

257. THINK AFFIRMATIVE, supra note 220, at 14.
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,,211
be met precisely ....
If the purpose of the goal/quota debate is to suggest that
goals are necessarily legitimate because they are less rigid than
quotas, the argument is unpersuasive. The essential issue is
whether the plan creates a racial preference in the sense that
blacks must be hired regardless of qualifications. Quotas mandate such a result-but so may goals if setting them too high
requires hiring unqualified workers.
Ultimately, therefore, affirmative action plans must be defended on a different basis, namely, that the goals established
merely reflect accurately the work force composition which would
occur if legitimate, racially-neutral personnel policies were employed. The goals should not indicate a preference for blacks, but
should merely show that they are not being discriminated
against. Even if set in accordance with this approach, however,
the goals would still lead to racial preferences absent the "good
faith" escape hatch. Just as a purely random assignment of workers to employers might result in disproportionate black-white distributions in some firms, so also might the application of legitimate criteria in particular cases yield distributions of employees
that do not reflect their distribution in the relevant geographic
labor market. The "good faith" excuse (which, when properly
viewed, merely amounts to a defense in terms of operating a nondiscriminatory employment system) is necessary to avoid creating an incentive for racial preference in order to meet the affirmative action goals.
This analysis suggests that affirmative action plans should
be subject to (1) an equal protection examination to determine
whether the goals established are the result of a reasonable effort
to project the consequences of non-discrimination, as opposed to
creating racial preferences; and, (2) an inquiry as to whether the
good faith defense is a viable one in that it may be established
merely by proving that all vestiges of discrimination have been
removed from the employment system. Such plans should, however, be considered suspect racial classification only when they
fail to pass muster under these two standards. Obviously, this
task requires delicate balancing, but it is a task which courts have
258. Id. See also Appendix I of TIHNK AFFiRMATIVE which contains a September, 1969,
Memorandum entitled, Federal Policy on Remedies Concerning Equal Employment Opportunity in State and Local Government Personnel Systems, discussing goals versus
quotas.
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shown a willingness to undertake.
The most recent case addressing the constitutionality of affirmative action plans is Associated General Contractors of
Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 9 which involved state specifications for
a construction contract requiring "not less than twenty percent
ratio of minority employee man hours to total employee man
hours in each job category.

'20

Such language appears to establish

a quota. Further, the contractors were required to employ "every
possible measure" to comply with the contract. Another provision
in the contract, however, required that all workers be
"competent," which the state had construed to mean "qualified."
In holding this scheme constitutional, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that official recognition of race is necessary to
achieve fair and equal opportunity for minorities:
The first Justice Harlan's much quoted observation that "the
Constitution [is color-blind] .. . [and] does not . . . permit

any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be
protected in the enjoyment of such rights," Plessy v.Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 554, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 1145, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896)
(dissenting opinion) has come to represent a long-term goal. It
is by now well understood, however, that our society cannot be
completely colorblind in the short term if we are to have a colorblind society in the long term. After centuries of viewing through
colored lenses, eyes do not quickly adjust when the lenses are
removed. Discrimination has a way of perpetuating itself, albeit
unintentionally, because the resulting inequalities make new
opportunities less accessible. Preferential treatment is one partial prescription to remedy our society's most intransigent and
deeply rooted inequalities. 0 '
After citing cases where race recognition had been upheld as a
part of a plan to remedy discrimination, and other decisions sustaining specific percentage goals and timetables for minority
hiring, the court acknowledged that the instant case should be
handled carefully:
259. 490 F.2d 9 (lst Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). See also Contractors
Ass'n of E. Penn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
854 (1971). See also Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 1965 (1974), for a view of an affirmative action plan as a court imposed remedy for
discrimination.
260. 490 F.2d at 11.
261. Id. at 16.
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This marks for the first time, to our knowledge, that a court has
been asked to sanction a plan for hiring a specific percentage of
minority workers that requires an employer to take "every possible measure" to reach the goal on each job site, and places upon
him the burden of proving compliance, under threat of serious
penalties if that burden is not sustained. It is but a short step
from these requirements to demand that an employer fix an
absolute percentage preference to members of a racial minority,
regardless of their qualifications and without consideration of
their availability within the general population. 82
While acknowledging that such a use of racial criteria to
remedy discrimination sometimes may be counter-productive by
maximizing social divisiveness, or even be malignant rather than
benign, the court found that the means employed by Massachusetts to remedy racial imbalance resulting from discrimination in
the construction trades was justified.2 3 Further, such plans cannot force employers to hire "unqualified" workers. To protect
contractors from this prospect, the court recognized that fair procedures, including a full hearing, are required before imposing
sanctions for a contractor's failure to use "every possible measure
to achieve compliance. 2164 Whether the standard for compliance
is "good faith," as set by the South Carolina Commission, or
"every possible measure," it appears that the focus of inquiry at
a hearing would be on the same questions of business justification
raised in a basic discrimination case.
A second approach, alternative to Altshuler as a means of
legitimizing affirmative actions plans, would be simply to argue
that, even if such plans mandate racial preferences in favor of
blacks ("reverse discrimination"), the plans are constitutional.
The argument would be either that racial discrimination against
non-minority persons is not suspect, or that, even if suspect,
"benign" discrimination can be justified under the compelling
state interest notion.
Last term, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine the constitutionality of preference programs favoring racial
262. Id. at 17.
263. Id. at 18 n.15. Minorities constituted 23 percent of the population of Boston and
40 percent of the inhabitants of the neighborhoods in which the state's plan was to be
applied; however, they constituted only 4 percent of building trades employment, an area
where the unions had a long history of discrimination. 490 F.2d at 13-14, 18.
264. The Court relied on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1971); cf.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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minorities in two cases. In the more celebrated case, DeFunis v.
Odegaard,6 5 which concerned preferential admission to the University of Washington Law School, the Court found the case to
be moot and so avoided the question. The Court, however, did
face the issue in a less noted decision concerning employment
preferences for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In Morton
266 the statute under attack provided that "qualified
v. Mancari
Indians shall hereafter have the preference to appointments to
vacancies." ' 7
The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Blackmun,
found the purpose of the preference was:
to give Indians a greater participation in their own, selfgovernment; to further the Government's trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative effect of
having non-Indians administer matters that affect tribal life.
Congress was well aware that the proposed preference would
result in employment disadvantages within the BIA for nonIndians. Not only was this displacement unavoidable if room
were to be made for Indians, but it was explicitly determined
that gradual replacement of non-Indians within the Bureau was
a desirable feature of the entire program for self-government.26
Because the Court decided that the 1972 amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, extending coverage to federal employees,
had not repealed the preference by implication, it had to consider
the constitutionality of the preference.2 69 In an attempt to limit

the scope of the decision, Justice Blackmun first discussed the
"unique legal status" of Indian tribes in the Constitution,"' and
the potential broad impact of a finding that special treatment of
Indians was invidious race discrimination:
265. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
266. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). See textual discussion at notes 110-11 supra.
267. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1962).
268. 417 U.S. at 541-42, 544-45 (citations omitted).
269. Since a federal statute was involved, the Court employed the rationale of Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), that incorporates equal protection notions under the
fourteenth amendment into the due process clause of the fifth amendment, thus imposing
an equal protection restraint on actions of the federal government.
270. Congress is empowered to "regulate Commerce . . .with the Indian tribes,"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3, and the President may, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, make treaties with such tribes. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
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Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and
reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA,
single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians
living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians,
were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of
the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased
and the solemn committment of the Government toward the
Indians would be jeopardized.2'
While it is incontrovertable that Indian tribes are given special
constitutional status, that Congress has treated Indians specially
and that the courts have accepted that treatment, still the preference here was not the result of any treaty or commerce with
Indian tribes. Instead, it was a preference within the federal government for employment that benefitted individual qualified job
applicants who happened to be of Indian origin. A finding that
such a preference is invidious race discrimination would not necessarily overthrow special arrangements with Indian tribes based
on treaties or commerce.
More intriguing than the sui generis treatment of Indians,
however, is Justice Blackmun's attempt to escape the confines of
the new equal protection analysis by finding no racial discrimination at all in the preference. Thus, a footnote 2 2 tries to shoehorn
the statute into a narrower reading tied to Indian tribe status,
rather than race, by referring to a BIA regulation limiting the
preference to members of "federally recognized" tribes. While
this does limit the sweep of the preference to fewer than all individuals who can be classified racially as Indians, the failure of the
classification to be exactly coextensive with racial lines does not
23
make it any less a racial classification. 1
Although Justice Blackmun insists that no racial discrimination or even a racial preference is involved, in reality he may be
relying on a belief that the classification is not invidious and
therefore should be upheld, presumably under the reasonable relationship, or "old" equal protection, standard:
271. 417 U.S. at 552.
272. Id. at 553 n.24.
273. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court found race discrimination
when 150 Chinese were denied permission to run laundries while some Chinese and 80 nonChinese were not similarly treated. But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97, n.20
(1974), where the Court held that pregnancy discrimination did not constitute sex discrimination because not all women become pregnant. See textual discussion at notes 102-15
supra.
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[I]t is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further
the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more
responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. It is directed
to participation by the governed in the governing agency ....
Furthermore, the preference applies only to employment in the
Indian service. The preference does not cover any other government agency or activity, and we need not consider the obviously
more difficult question that would be presented by a blanket
exemption for Indians from all civil service examination. Here,
the preference is reasonably and directly related to a legitimate,
non-racially based goal or goals: This is the principal characteris absent from proscribed forms of racial
istic that generally
4
discrimination.
Another decision handed down by the Court last term may
also suggest that discrimination favoring oppressed classes is subject to a less rigorous standard of review, although the meaning
of Kahn v. Shevin 75 is somewhat obscured because that case
dealt with a sex-related preference rather than a racial one. Kahn
involved a challenge to a state tax preference for widows which
was not available to widowers. The Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Douglas, sustained the statute, a result which, only a few
years ago, could have been easily predicted under the rational
relationship test applied to sex discriminations. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has moved toward a more interventionist attitude toward sex-differentiating legislation. In Reed v.
Reed 17 a male preference for the administration of estates was
struck down as not having a "fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation,"2 presumably an intermediate standard
falling between rational relationship criteria and the strict scrutiny test triggered by suspect classifications. Additionally, in
5 which invalidated an armed forces
Frontiero v. Richardson,2
dependent-benefit scheme favoring male service persons over
females, four justices held that sex was a suspect classification
while four others thought the case could be decided under the
Reed test, without the necessity for passing on whether sex was
suspect.20
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

417 U.S. at 554.
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
E.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Id.
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall favored suspect class treat-

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/3

78

Sullivan and Zimmer: The South Carolina Human Affairs Law: Two Steps Forward, One Step

1975]

HUMAN AFFAIRS LAW

In light of this background, interpreting Kahn v. Shevin
proves difficult. To begin with, Justice Douglas' opinion for the
majority explicitly rests the decision on the Reed "fair and substantial relation" test.21 This is puzzling because Douglas had
been one of those in Frontiero believing that sex was suspect;
further, in his post-Kahn dissent in Geduldig v. Aiello,2 2 Douglas
reiterated that sex was a suspect classification. 2 1 Thus, if Douglas' opinion in Kahn is to be reconciled with his views in Frontiero
and Geduldig, one must argue that discriminations in favor of
women are subject to a lower standard of review than discriminations against them. Although we cannot necessarily attribute
Douglas' views to the other members of the Kahn majority, the
2 1possibility is at least thought-provoking.
Secondly, the dissent of Justice Brennan, in which Justice
Marshall joined, also suggests that some reverse discrimination
may be legal. The opinion argued that sex classification is suspect
but that cushioning spousal loss for widows "serves a compelling
government interest."I 4 Although ultimately concluding that the
classification was invalid because it could have been more narrowly drawn to satisfy that interest (by excluding tax assistance
from women without need for it), the dissent's readiness to find
a compelling state interest for "benign" discrimination is noteworthy. This readiness is underscored by comparing Mr. Justice
White's dissent, which, although also using suspect class status
for sex as a starting point, suggests that if the purpose is "to
alleviate current economic necessity" it should apply to both
sexes.2 5 Thus, it would seem that Brennan and Marshall would
ment; Justice Stewart, in a separate opinion, in which Justices Powell, Blackmun and
Burger concurred, relied on the authority of Reed v. Reed. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
281. 416 U.S. at 355.
282. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
283. Justice Douglas joined in Justice Brennan's dissent which declared: "I continue
to adhere to my view [in Frontiero]that 'classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.'" [417 U.S. at 503]. To the same effect is
Justice Brennan's dissent in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 511 (1975), in which Justices
Douglas and Marshall joined.
283.1. Cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975).
284. 416 U.S. at 358.
285. Id. at 361. Justice White's opinion is unclear with respect to the constitutionality
of a discriminatory practice designed to rectify needs "rooted in past and present economic
discrimination against women." He avoids the issue by finding this not a "credible explanation" for the preference since it is limited to only some women- widows. Although not
examining the point in detail, Justice White may have been influenced by the possibility
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approve a preference favoring only women so long as it was as
narrowly drawn within that sex as feasible.
Another line of Supreme Court cases, the school desegregation decisions, upholds the discretionary powers of administrative
agencies to consider race as a basis of classification in the exercise
of a duty to operate integrated schools. The key case is Green v.
County School Board,"' where, in striking down a "freedom of
choice" plan to end a dual school system, the Court recognized
the affirmative duty of school authorities to end segregation by
operating integrated school systems:
School boards such as the respondent then operating statecompelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch.27
As part of that affirmative duty to integrate, the school authorities were armed with the discretion to use racial classifications,
a discretion broader than that available to courts to remedy de
jure segregation. Thus, in Swann v. Board of Education,"' Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, indicated that:
School authorities . . . might well conclude, for example, that
in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this
as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional
violation, however, that would not be within the authority of a
federal court.25
that widows, as a class, are, if anything, less likely than women generally to feel the effects
of economic discrimination since widows may be vicarious beneficiaries of the class benefiting from the discrimination-their husbands.
Justice White's opinion is also intriguing in suggesting that a compensatory discrimination favoring an oppressed class will be difficult to justify unless all oppressed classes
are likewise favored. Thus, he writes:
Moreover, even if past discrimination is considered to be the criterion for current
tax exemption, the State nevertheless ignores all those widowers who have felt
the effects of economic discrimination, whether as a member of a racial group
or as one of many who cannot escape the cycle of poverty.
Id. at 361-62.
286. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
287. Id. at 437-38.
288. 402 U.S. 1.(1971).
289. Id. at 16.
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The Swann Court not only referred with approval to one of its
previous decisions upholding the use of a fixed ratio of white to
black teachers to desegregate the faculties of a dual system, 9 ' but
also approved for the first time the use of racial quotas by a
district court for student desegregation. Although this aspect of
the opinion was heavily qualified,"9 ' the Court nevertheless affirmed that such an approach had a place as a remedy for denials
of equal protection.
Since the Swann cases, there has been some split in the
previous unanimity of the Court and some limitation in scope of
Swann remedies. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver,
Colorado,92 the majority opinion, by Justice Brennan, upheld a
finding of de jure segregation even though there had never been
a statute or ordinance requiring dual school systems. The basis
for the finding of intentional segregation was the manipulation of
student attendance zones, school site selection and a neighborhood school policy that had the effect of creating two racially
identifiable school systems. Justice Powell wrote an elaborate
opinion suggesting that the de facto/de jure dichotomy no longer
had meaning. He thought the proper test to be that:
where segregated public schools exist within a school district to
a substantial degree, there is a prima facie case that the...
[school authorities] are sufficiently responsible to warrant
imposing upon them a nationally applicable burden to demonstrate they nevertheless are operating a genuinely integrated
school system.19
Justice Powell's major support for abolishing the de jure/de facto
distinction was the evolution of the affirmative duty doctrine
from Brown I to Swann. While Brown originally meant that
blacks have "the right not to be compelled by state action to
attend a segregated school system,"29' 4 Powell now favored a right
290. Id. at 19-20, referringto United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Education,

395 U.S. 225 (1969).
291. The Court rejected the notion that "any particular degree of racial balance or
mixing existed 'as a matter of substantive constitutional right,'" id. at 24; further, it
approved the use of a ratio only in the context of a dual school system and the failure of
the school board to submit an appropriate desegregation plan to the district court. Finally,
the Court emphasized the limited use of mathematical ratios as "no more than a starting
point in the process of shaping a remedy." Id. at 25.
292. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result while Justice
Rehnquist dissented.
293. Id. at 224.
294. Id. at 225.
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to expect that "local school boards will operate integratedschool
systems." ' 5
While it would be grossly inaccurate to conclude that even
the basic issue questioning the constitutionality of reverse or
"benign" discrimination is settled, much less the parameters of
any such doctrine, it seems fair to conclude that there are a number of authoritative intimations that such conduct by a state will
at least be subject to a somewhat lower standard of review than
are "invidious" classifications. Accordingly, while it has been
argued above that a properly drawn and implemented affirmative
action plan does not constitute reverse dicrimination, neither affirmative action in general nor any plan in particular would be
condemned out of hand by a contrary conclusion. It would merely
trigger a detailed inquiry into the purpose, effects and qualifications underlying the discrimination along the lines that have been
suggested.
CONCLUSION

Although it may be presumptuous to attempt to briefly summarize an article which has considered as many diverse topics as
the present effort, it is possible to recapitulate some of the major
problems of interpreting the Human Affairs Law treated in the
two installments of this article. In this connection, it must be
noted that, as this installment goes to press, the Human Affairs
Commission has sponsored a number of amendments to the
statute which may be considered by the General Assembly in the
near future. While it is premature to analyze these proposals in
any detail, it is interesting to compare the proposed legislative
solutions with some of the problems we have examined. In the
process, some alternative recommendations for resolving the difficulties in the present law will be noted.
To begin with, it is plain that a major shortcoming of the
statute, with respect to its announced purpose of eliminating
employment discrimination within South Carolina, lies in the
fact that the "coercive" power of the Human Affairs Commission
applies only to certain government employment situations. The
statute is quite explicit in limiting this power to public employment,"' and one court decision has subsequently narrowed even
295. Id. at 225-26 (emphasis in original).
296. Sullivan 8iZimmer, supra note 1, at 9, 18-21.
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this reach by excluding municipalities from the law's coverage."'
If South Carolina is to have a comprehensive employment discrimination statute, these limitations must be removed. Although we have argued that individuals may be able to maintain
a private cause of action against acts violating the antidiscrimination public policy announced in the Human Affairs
298
Law, even if not within the coercive power of the Commission,
it would plainly be preferable to create a statutory remedy for
such conduct in order to avoid the uncertainties attending judicial recognition of this right. Adoption of the Commission's proposed amendments to the statute would be a major step towards
this end. By redefining the basic statutory violation from the
present "unfair discriminatory practices" to "unlawful" ones,
and, by defining violators as "persons," broadly drafted to include all private employers, the scope of the law would be widened to embrace all employment discrimination within the state.
Unlike title VII, the statute would not be limited to employers of
a certain number of employees.
The second major difficulty that emerged from our study of
the Human Affairs Law was the lack of explicit provisions concerning enforcement of Commission orders. 299 Although it is the
thesis of this article that enforcement powers may be found without the need for additional legislation merely by looking to the
state's general remedial scheme,"' unnecessary litigation could
be avoided by passing a clarifying statute. In this respect, the
Commission's proposed amendments recommend some praiseworthy changes. Thus, the Commission would be able to obtain
a court decree incorporating the Commission's order 30 days from
its issuance if neither party to the dispute appeals to the court of
common pleas within that time. Although there are some defects
in the amendments as currently formulated, including the absence of a standard of review to be employed by the court on
appeal, the general approach is sound. First, Commission orders,
in effect, become court orders after 30 days unless an appeal is
297. See note 2, supra. In the interest of full disclosure, the authors should note that,
at the request of the court, they submitted an amicus curiaebrief arguing that municipalities were within the coercive power of the Commission under the Human Affairs Law as
originally drafted. The court rejected this contention, and the Commission decided not
to appeal the court's determination.
298. Sullivan & Zimmer, supra note 1, at 61-79.
299. Id. at 38-61.
300. Id. at 12-18.
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filed; secondly, the respondent is provided with an avenue of
judicial review in accordance with the state constitution;"' finally, the amendments apparently permit the complainant also
to appeal an order against the respondent, presumably on the
ground that it is inadequate, thus providing some assurance that
this interest will be protected.12 One difficulty, however, is that

the proposed amendments. do not provide any judicial redress for
complainants when, after a hearing, the Commission dismisses a
complaint entirely. This is objectionable not only because of the
constitutional problems it raises, 33 but also because it is anomolous to deny any such review in light of the provision permitting
a complainant judicial review of a Commission order providing
inadequate relief. Presumably, the effect of broadened coverage
and enhanced enforcement powers would qualify the Commission
as a deferral agency under the EEOC regulations. '
Another problem with the statute involves the authority of
the Commission to impose affirmative action plans on governmental agencies. Although we have argued that a Governor's
order would constitute sufficient authority, there is some question
as to whether an executive order to this effect now exists. The
Governor could, of course, resolve this difficulty by formally issuing one. Alternatively, as the Commission's proposals suggest, the
legislature could amend the statute to authorize such plans. The
difficulty with the formulation of the proposed changes, however
(and perhaps a problem with any executive order), is how the
Commission would enforce compliance. The amendments do provide for a general Commission power to "institute proceedings
.. . to prevent and restrain any person or persons from violating
any provision of this Act,""' a power independent of Commission
authority to enforce its orders against unlawful discriminatory
practices and therefore one applicable to an authorized Commission requirement of affirmative action plans. The only provision
of the statute, as it would be amended, which is relevant to af301. Id. at 13-14.
302. One major defect with the proposed amendments is their failure to come to grips
with one of the major state constitutional issues raised in the first installment of this
article: whether the Commission's power to dismiss a complaint before hearing without
being subjected to judicial review is repugnant to the state constitution. Id. at 13-16, 3839, n.165.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 21-37.
305. Commission document.
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firmative action is the creation of a Commission power to require
3 '
"submission of equal employment plans and reports.""
Plainly,
the submission of plans does not necessarily include their implementation. While it would be possible to infer that implementation is covered, it would be far better to state so expressly.
Turning from the procedual problems with the Human Affairs statute to questions of substantive law, this article has suggested that, by and large, the decisions under title VII provide a
ready and coherent source of law for the Commission and the
courts to look to in interpreting the statute. The Commission's
proposed amendments make only two possibly substantive
changes: first, a definition of "discrimination" ' " which, if it does
not refer to Griggs, at least does not depart from the analysis
which we have considered in some detail,"' and, secondly, a defintion of age to mean "age between 40 and 65." This latter
change would resolve the thorny problem of reconciling the
Human Affairs Law with the state mandatory retirement age
provisions, °9 but, as we have suggested, it is perhaps not the
appropriate policy choice. It is, after all, somewhat anomalous,
on the one hand, to bar arbitrary age discrimination while, on the
other, setting arbitrary limits on the prohibition. ' Further, an
important omission from the proposed amendments is a provision
which would clear up the question of the legality of citizenship
3 11
discrimination.
In sum, the proposed amendments to the statute would go a
long way towards eliminating some of the major difficulties which
this article has noted in the Human Affairs Law. Nevertheless,
there are numerous problems remaining, many of which are not
susceptible to legislative solution. It is to be hoped that the efforts
made in this article will provide a basis upon which the Commission and the courts can build in implementing the law to maximize the protection of human rights in South Carolina.
306. Id.
307. "'Discrimination'

means any direct or indirect act or practice of exclusion,

distinction, restriction, segregation, limitation, refusal, denial or any other act or practice
of differentiation or preference in the treatment of a person or persons because of race,
color, creed, sex, age between forty and sixty-five, or national origin .
"Id.
308. See text at notes 27-45 supra.

309. See text at notes 202-15 supra.
310. See text at note 215 supra.
311. See text at notes 193-201 supra.
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